Moral reasoning is fundamental to the human condition, and moral reasoning is a distinctly human ability (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). From early on, children differentiate between right and wrong (Bloom, 2013), and the people around them convey moral concepts in direct and indirect ways (Li, 2011; Miller, Fung, Lin, Chen, & Boldt, 2012). Some of these moral concepts are common across cultures, whereas others are culturally varied.

In recent decades, research on moral reasoning has moved from a focus on the development of a limited set of moral concepts, such as those pertaining to justice and rights (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981; Piaget, 1932/1965), to addressing diverse concepts. This includes care and prosociality, as well as religious and spiritual reasons (Colby & Damon, 1992; Dien, 1982; Gilligan, 1982; Jensen, 2008; Miller, 1989; Shweder, 1990). In this respect, moral development research is akin to other areas of psychology that also have moved from a focus on uniformity to multiplicity. For example, instead of exclusive attention to one kind of self, one kind of intelligence, and one kind of creativity, researchers now describe multiple selves (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), intelligences...
(Gardner, 1993; Sternberg, 1985), and creativities (Lubart, 1999; Mourguès, Barbot, Tan, & Grigorenko, 2016). Often this expanded focus has arisen from research with diverse groups within and across countries (Jensen, 2011).

One of my own most vivid moments of recognizing multiplicity in moral psychology occurred about two decades ago when I went to interview a fundamentalist Baptist American woman as part of a research project on the moral reasoning of adults from religiously conservative and liberal communities in India and the United States (Jensen, 1997, 1998). I could tell from the moment that I pulled into her driveway that she held strong convictions. Her parked car was plastered with bumper stickers, including “Life is short. Pray hard. Read the Book!” Inside, there were many religious items in the living room. After some friendly introductions I commenced the interview, but I had merely asked a few questions when she suddenly gripped my arm and implored me to kneel down on the floor with her and ask Jesus to come into my heart. She was passionate, beseeching. I desperately cast about in my mind for a reply to a plea that I had never encountered (see also Jensen, 2015a). An American researcher might have had more familiarity with the situation, but being a fairly recent immigrant from Denmark, I had none. Religion is largely, if not entirely, absent from individual and collective considerations in Denmark (Arnett & Jensen, 2015; Zuckerman & Thompson, Chapter 33 in this volume).

But here I was, face to face with a most sincere religious plea. I finally gave her hand a gentle squeeze and said that now was not the right time. While the experience was entirely outside my research protocol, it was a singularly revealing moment in my work because I understood that while I had come to the woman’s house in search of knowledge about human psychology, she had opened her door to try to save my soul. Moreover, this purpose was of supreme moral importance to her because to become “saved,” in this religiously conservative Christian worldview, is not only the path to better moral understanding and behavior in this life, but also to salvation in the next.

I took several lessons from this encounter. One is that morality suffuses intra- and interpersonal psychology and behavior. Moral reasoning takes place in the mind of the individual as well as in dyadic and group interactions. Second, moral concepts are highly diverse, with some concepts being widely shared across cultures and others much less so. Third, while moral reasoning is framed by cultural worldviews, it also spurs diverse individual decisions and actions—as in the case of this woman who was the only one among many religiously conservative participants to try to convert me.

This chapter first addresses five influential lines of theory and research, proceeding in roughly chronological order from earlier to recent work. Specifically, cognitive-developmental, domain, care and prosociality, identity, and cultural-developmental approaches to moral reasoning are described. For each approach, the focus is on its main contributions and the extent to which it encompasses development across diverse cultures. This review is followed by a discussion of three promising future research directions: (1) the need for research on moral development over the full life span, (2) conceptualizing moral reasoning not only as intrapersonal but also interpersonal, and (3) implications of globalization for moral development.

Before proceeding, a brief definition of culture. Here, culture is defined as symbolic, behavioral, and institutional inheritances that are shared and co-constructed by members of a community (Goodnow & Lawrence, 2015). Culture is not synonymous with country or ethnicity, but rather
describes communities whose members share key beliefs, values, behaviors, routines, and institutions. As scholars addressing cultural issues have long observed, cultural communities include heterogeneity among groups and individuals. Variation also exists between cultural communities, including on their degree of heterogeneity, intergroup contest, degree of change over time, and access to power (Jensen, 2016).

The Cognitive-Developmental Approach
Starting in the late 1950s, Kohlberg (e.g., 1958, 1981, 1984) formulated a cognitive-developmental approach to moral reasoning that has influenced subsequent research in many ways. Inspired by Piaget (1932/1965) among others, Kohlberg wanted to find out if moral reasoning develops in a predictable sequence. To help answer this question, he initially interviewed American children and adolescents using “hypothetical dilemmas.” Drawing on participants’ responses to the dilemmas as well as his knowledge of Western rationalist moral philosophy, Kohlberg concluded that moral reasoning occurs in a sequence of three levels, with each level comprising two stages.

Figure 13.1 provides a visual representation of Kohlberg’s well-known sequence. To briefly recap the theory, every child starts out at the preconventional level, reasoning in terms of ego-centered considerations. The child initially focuses on avoidance of punishment and obtainment of rewards (Stage 1) and then on satisfaction of self-interests (Stage 2). Next follows the conventional level and a shift to group-centered considerations. Here, the focus is on adhering to the norms of family and other groups to which one belongs (Stage 3) and maintaining social order (Stage 4). The third postconventional level goes beyond both the self and one’s society. Here, the emphasis is on democratic procedure and social utility (Stage 5) or universal principles pertaining to justice and individual rights (Stage 6).

To Kohlberg, it was not only that his six stages describe what moral development may be like. He claimed that his stages also describe what moral development ought to be like. If more people can be educated to reach Stage 6, according to Kohlberg, individuals will be more moral and can join together to create communities that are more just. The desire to go from moral psychology to moral philosophy, “from is to ought” (Kohlberg, 1981), certainly did not originate with Kohlberg. But it is an aspiration that has continued to both inspire and discomfit moral development research.

Extensive research has found that the first three of the cognitive-developmental stages are common across cultures, whereas the others are not. Across many cultures,
younger children often use the concepts from Stages 1 and 2, and, in the course of adolescence, the concepts from Stage 3 become widely used (Snarey, 1985). Stages 4 and 5, however, are uncommon, and Stage 6 is so rare that it was removed from the cognitive-developmental scoring manual by the early 1980s (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).

In Snarey’s (1985) comprehensive review of 44 cross-cultural studies using the cognitive-developmental approach, 66% of studies found no reasoning at Stages 4 or 5. Even in the 34% of studies where these two stages did occur, they were found only in rare cultural settings. Only a subset of Western or Westernized middle and upper-middle class adolescents and adults residing in urban areas reasoned in terms of Stages 4 and 5.

Extensive research across cultures using Kohlberg’s dilemmas or coding manual has also found that children, adolescents, and adults think in terms of moral concepts that the cognitive-developmental approach does not take into consideration (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Richards & Davison, 1992; Vasudev & Hummel, 1987; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995). One such set of moral concepts pertains to religion and spirituality. Walker, who has contributed extensive cognitive-developmental research, has critiqued this omission. He observed that the cognitive-developmental manual includes 708 “criterion judgments” for scoring moral reasoning but is “bereft” of notions of religiosity, spirituality, or divinity (Walker et al., 1995, p. 384).

Researchers have also concluded that concepts pertaining to community, collectivity, and interdependence also are not well-accounted for by the cognitive-developmental approach (e.g., Dien, 1982; Edwards, 1997; Ma, 1988; Snarey, 1985; Walker & Moran, 1991). Yet members of many cultures place a premium on such concepts. For example, research with Chinese children has shown that, by age 4, they are well aware of notions pertaining to shame, loss of face, social discretion, and role-based duties (Fung, 1999; Miller, Wiley, Fung, & Liang, 1997). The development of moral reasoning is well under way at an early age in these children. Yet it is reasoning aligned with Confucian ideals of social hierarchy and harmony, rather than the Western ideals of justice and individual rights at the end of Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental sequence.

In sum, children across many cultures develop along the path of the first half of the cognitive-developmental stage sequence. From early on, however, they also take other paths with other end goals. A small proportion of middle-class, Western and Westernized urban adolescents and adults also reason in terms of some of the concepts in the second half of Kohlberg’s sequence, but those also are not the only concepts in their moral repertoire. Accordingly, some theorists have revised the top half of the Kohlbergian sequence with the aim of maintaining a stage-like structure with different end-goal concepts (Gibbs, 2014; Ma, 1988; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999; Snarey & Keljo, 1991). Alternative models by Gibbs and by Rest and colleagues have generated a lot of research, including an applied nature. As we will see later, however, most researchers addressing a broader swath of moral concepts have found it necessary to go beyond Kohlbergian theory.

As a final note to the cognitive-developmental approach, it is interesting to ponder that Snarey’s review of cross-cultural studies was published in 1985. The world has changed significantly since then. By 2008—for the first time in human history—more people were living in urban areas than in rural ones (Population Reference Bureau, 2008). Most of the urbanization has...
occurred in developing countries. These migrants certainly are not all middle-class, and while exposed to ideas from the West, they also are not all Westernized. Nonetheless, a question worth asking is whether some of the kinds of Stage 4 and 5 concepts that were found among Western and Westernized adolescents and adults in Snarey's review might have become more common. With urbanization and globalization, it would be reasonable to expect that more people have moral viewpoints that give consideration to society as a whole and individuals as independent entities. If these kinds of moral concepts are becoming more commonplace, this would not attest to a cognitive-developmental stage structure. Instead, it would suggest the importance of particular cultural and contextual milieus in moral development. It also seems perfectly plausible that other moral concepts, local or hybrid ones, might form part of people's moral repertoires in non-Western globalizing parts of the world.

The Domain Approach
In the latter half of the 1970s, Turiel and his colleagues proposed taking a step back from Kohlberg's question of how moral reasoning develops to the question of what is moral in the first place (e.g., Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1975). Turiel and colleagues wanted to find out whether children differentiate moral from non-moral issues. Based on a similar tradition of Western rationalist philosophy that Kohlberg drew on (e.g., Gewirth, 1978; Rawls, 1971), they argued that in order for a rule to be moral, key criteria are that it applies to everyone and that it cannot be altered (e.g., Turiel, 1983). If children were to be asked whether these criteria of universality and inalterability apply to different kinds of issues, would they make distinctions between moral and nonmoral issues? Also, would their reasoning in response to the issues vary? To address these research questions, Turiel and his colleagues have often presented children and adolescents with vignettes. For example, in one vignette, a child pushes a peer off a swing, and in another a child calls a grandfather by his first name.

Turiel and his colleagues have concluded that three domains of knowledge can be differentiated, even if occasional overlap occurs (Smetana, 1983). One of these domains is moral. The other two, termed "conventional" and "personal," are not. (Domain researchers have recently renamed the latter two domains "societal" and "psychological," but here the original terms will be used since nearly all research cited has used them). According to Turiel and his colleagues, the three domains differ on criteria, reasoning, and issues. With respect to criteria, conventional and personal rules—unlike moral ones—apply only to one's group or oneself, respectively. Also, conventional and personal rules—unlike moral ones—are alterable. With respect to reasoning, moral rules are justified in terms of references to justice, fairness, and harm to other individuals. Conventional reasoning, in contrast, focuses on communal and religious norms, interests, and authorities. Personal reasoning focuses on the welfare of the self. Based on these criteria and modes of reasoning, according to domain theorists, examples of moral issues include stealing and aggressive acts (such as pushing someone off a swing). Conventional issues involve a wide variety of acts such as those pertaining to forms of address (such as calling a grandfather by first name), attire (such as wearing a head scarf), and sexual customs (such as premarital sex). Personal issues include one's choice of friends and recreational activities. Figure 13.2 depicts the domain approach. The implication of Turiel's conclusion is a circumscribed moral domain. Morality, from this perspective, is
solely that which goes beyond both self and society, akin only to the highest stages in Kohlberg's approach.

Within this perspective, too, there is limited attention paid to the development of domain differentiation. The argument is that the features of the three domains are inherent and that a young child, through independent observation and exposure to diverse behaviors, will conclude that harm to another individual or discrepant treatment of two similar individuals, for example, are prima facie evidence of moral consequence. Meanwhile, the child will also conclude that eating with one's hands, running around naked, or feeling happy about listening to music are not of moral consequence.

Research findings across cultures have shown that children make a distinction between the moral and nonmoral as defined by the domain approach for a very particular set of vignettes. In many parts of the world, children—even as young as 3 years of age—differentiate "moral" vignettes where an innocent child is pushed, hit, or robbed from "conventional" vignettes where children eat food with their fingers or fail to follow the rules of a game. By and large, children respond to these vignettes in terms of the criteria and reasons that the domain approach predicts (e.g., Ardila-Rey & Killen, 2001; Hollos, Leis, & Turiel, 1986; Nucci, Camino, & Sapiro, 1996; Yau & Smetana, 2003). Even very young children, contrary to Kohlberg's theory, are capable of invoking fairness and avoidance of harm to other individuals in response to some moral issues.

In many other instances, however, the predicted correspondence between issues, criteria, and reasoning does not hold. This has been found, for example, for matters pertaining to showing respect (such as honoring a deathbed promise), helping others in need (such as taking an ailing elderly parent into one's household), sexuality (such as coed bathing), and avoiding disgusting behaviors (such as eating one's dead pet dog). In many parts of the world, children, adolescents, and adults apply "moral" criteria of universality and inalterability to these matters, but they reason in terms of what the domain approach deems nonmoral concepts such as role-based duty, social order, and spirituality (e.g., Edwards, 1997; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Nisan, 1987; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001; Zimba, 1994).

Research also indicates that a large number of people will judge an issue to be moral but do not universalize their judgment. In other words, the universality criterion is not universal, or at least it is not necessarily the only or foremost criterion (Blasi, 1990). Based on a review of scholarship across history and cultures, Wilson (1993, p. 197) concluded that "universalism is not natural, localism is." Studies with religiously conservative groups, for example, have documented their hierarchical worldview (e.g., Ammerman, 1987; Jensen, 1997; Jensen & McKenzie, 2016; Vainio, 2015). In this view, God is above humans. Among humans, differences exist in some respects between various groups, including believers and nonbelievers. Based on such
a worldview, a conservative Christian can maintain that one may require more morally out of a Christian than a non-Christian (e.g., sexual abstinence prior to marriage, modesty in dress, tithing). An orthodox Jew can hold that moral expectations for Jews are different from those for non-Jews (e.g., keeping kosher, circumcision).

Furthermore, research where participants discuss their own moral experiences also suggests a more complex picture. Such research is illuminating because it provides emic rather than etic information about morality; that is, how research participants rather than theorists define and delineate morality. Research with Canadian adults, for example, has shown that they discuss a wide variety of reasons to justify their moral actions, including their own psychological well-being—a reason that the domain approach presumably would deem personal rather than moral (Walker, 2013; Walker et al., 1995). Research with moral exemplars from the United States has found that they vary considerably on the concepts they invoke to account for their remarkable moral contributions and behaviors. Common concepts pertained to justice, charity, harmony, and religious faith (Colby & Damon, 1992). Only the first of these concepts is moral, according to domain theory. In short, accounts from people's real moral lives of their moral motives—whether ordinary or extraordinary—blend considerations from the three domains.

Taken together, these findings suggest that children in many parts of the world recognize that not all issues are of the same hue. Children and adults from diverse cultures, however, appear to regard a wide variety of issues and reasons as moral that are not included within the moral palette of the domain approach. In recent years, some research on domain theory has compared judgments of vignettes where the circumstances (what domain researchers term “contexts”) surrounding a judgment vary (e.g., Gasser, Malti, & Buholzer, 2014; Killen & Stangor, 2001). This research often compares “straightforward” scenarios (e.g., exclusion based on group membership in general) to “multifaceted” ones (e.g., exclusion based on group membership under varying circumstances). Children’s and adolescents’ responses to the multifaceted scenarios tend to encompass diverse reasons, including fairness and group functioning. Domain theorists, however, continue only to classify the former as a moral reason (Killen & Smetana, 2015).

**Care and Prosociality Approaches**

In the late 1970s and 1980s, Gilligan (1977, 1982) came to the conclusion that there are two kinds of moral orientations. She based this on interviews with American children and adults about hypothetical moral issues and on interviews with women who were contemplating having an abortion. One is a “justice” orientation, focused on how to negotiate among competing individual interests and rights in an impartial manner. This orientation, according to Gilligan, is characteristic of a male gender identity. The other orientation, however, pertains to “care” and is more characteristic of a female identity. Here the concern is with bringing into harmony one's own needs with the needs of those with whom one has relationships.

Gilligan's call to pay attention to a care orientation occurred in the context of her broader critique that there had been a lengthy history of downgrading girls and women in moral reasoning research. She argued that moral development theories, such as the cognitive-developmental one, have focused on justice and either ignored or demoted care considerations (Gilligan, 1982).

However, across cultures, research on gender differences has generally found that
females and males do not differ in their moral reasoning, even if in some cultures both genders speak more of care whereas in others they are more concerned with justice (e.g., Shimizu, 2001; Walker, 1984). Nonetheless, Gilligan’s differentiation of two orientations in the late 1970s spurred and fit with new lines of research on multiplicity in general and caring in particular. Research has shown the emergence of caring and prosocial behaviors in infancy and toddlerhood (Vaish & Tomasello, 2014). This research has primarily been conducted in Europe and the United States. Findings indicate that very young children show tendencies toward collaboration, helping persons in need, sharing the rewards of joint activities, and protesting when someone engages in destruction, theft, or violation of group norms (Thompson, Chapter 5 in this volume; Vaish & Tomasello, 2014). In response to situations where someone needs help, toddlers and young children also express recognition of this need in both their reasoning as well as in emotional expressions of sympathy and empathy (e.g., Eisenberg, Lennon, & Roth, 1983; Hoffman, 2000; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). In a recent review, Vaish and Tomasello (2014) argued that early prosocial tendencies are universal and based in the evolutionary human heritage of interdependence and group-mindedness. They also conclude that “all of these tendencies are modified significantly by socialization and culture such that they might eventually look quite distinct across different groups and individuals” (p. 294). Trommsdorff (2015, Chapter 9 in this volume), too, has observed that early prosocial tendencies find culturally diverse expressions in development.

Indeed, research has documented notable ways that care and prosociality take distinctive cultural forms. Findings from India, for example, have shown that children and adolescents speak of care. Their reasoning, however, emphasizes role-based duties (e.g., Bersoff & Miller, 1993; Miller & Källberg-Shroff, Chapter 4 in this volume). In a research program spanning more than two decades, Miller and her colleagues have furthermore shown that, in India, beneficence and care for others is considered obligatory. The Indian concept of dharma, in particular, entails responsibility to care for friends and family members (cf., Bhangaokar, Chapter 18 in this volume). Duty is seen as inherent in one’s social roles. This perspective, according to Miller, is different from the starting assumptions of cognitive-developmental and domain approaches that regard care as discretionary (Miller & Bland, 2014). It also departs somewhat from Gilligan’s argument that caring is important as long as it does not override self-interest (Miller & Bland, 2014).

Furthermore, cultural research has shown that care and prosociality are extended not only to other individuals but also to communities as a whole, such as family and school. In interviews, Shimizu (2001) found that Japanese adolescents argued that they had a responsibility to repair broken school property because they were affiliated with the school and in order that the school would look well-maintained to others. Relatedly, Chinese have the concept of filial piety that entails moral obligations not only to individual family members but also in regard to the welfare and reputation of the family as a whole (Dien, 1982; Hwang, 1999; Yeh & Bedford, Chapter 21 in this volume).

Padilla-Walker and Carlo (2014) have encouraged a multidimensional approach to prosociality that includes consideration of different “targets” of care (such as a stranger, family member, and peer group), different “types” of behavior (such as helping, cooperating, and promotion of norms), and varying extents of “cost to
self” (ranging from self-regarding to entirely self-denying) (cf., Carlo & Pierotti, Chapter 3 in this volume). In sum, the motive to care about individuals and groups seems to be universal. Why we care, how we care, and in regard to whom, however, varies with development and among cultures. The vast majority of research on prosocial reasoning, emotions, and behavior has been conducted with children and adolescents (Padilla-Walker & Carlo, 2014). Research with adults of different ages would help to clarify how seemingly universal early prosocial tendencies come to “look quite distinct across different groups and individuals,” to return to the words of Vaish and Tomasello (2014). This would tell us about culture as well as about the parameters of our evolutionary heritage.

**Moral Identity Approaches**

In the early 1990s, Colby and Damon published *Some do Care: Contemporary Lives of Moral Commitment*. Their examination of the lives of “moral exemplars” from the United States became a key impetus for theory and research on moral identity. Blasi (1984), too, had called for a focus on moral identity. Colby and Damon’s project aimed to open up to new research in a number of ways. They focused on real rather than hypothetical or vignette-based moral issues. They focused on moral goodness rather than transgressions. They also wanted to address how moral behavior related to moral reasoning.

Based on their interviews with 23 moral exemplars, Colby and Damon concluded that moral reasoning is necessary but insufficient in forming a moral identity. In their view, there is a dialectical process where one’s reasoning supports one’s moral behaviors. In turn, moral behavior renders future reasoning more refined and habitual. In regard to moral reasoning, Colby and Damon found that the majority of exemplars reasoned at the conventional level of Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental sequence, with less than 20% scoring at Stage 5. They did not take this finding to mean that moral reasoning does not impact moral behavior, but rather that the nuances of people’s reasoning and the full scope of their exemplars’ moral habits were not fully captured within cognitive-developmental theory. As the title of their book indicates, some exemplars reasoned in terms of care considerations. Colby and Damon also found that a number of the exemplars invoked religious and spiritual considerations to account for their extraordinary actions.

Recent scholarship on moral identity has addressed a number of issues (Lapsley, Reilly, & Narvaez, Chapter 37 in this volume), many of which are still subject to debate (Hardy, Krettenauer, & Hunt, Chapter 8 in this volume). For example, researchers have argued that while a dialectic between reasoning and behavior is necessary to form a moral identity, it is also necessary that morality per se is regarded as central to one’s sense of self (Blasi, 2004). Another issue is the extent to which someone with a moral identity is focused on self-interest. Researchers generally agree that having a moral identity entails a commitment to causes larger than the self (Flanagan et al., Chapter 41 in this volume; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009), but Walker and colleagues have highlighted that moral identity development is more likely to be successful if self-interest lines up with or, at least, does not run counter to these larger causes (Walker, 2013).

Given Erikson’s (1950) long-standing prominence in theory on identity development in general and given his focus on adolescence as the key time for identity formation, it is not surprising that developmental scholars addressing moral identity also have homed in on adolescence (Hardy, Walker, Olsen, Woodbury, &
Hickman, 2013). They have observed that it is an important time in life for acquisition of a sense of responsibility (Nunner-Winkler, 2007), the emergence of substantial consideration for others (Carlo & Pierotti, Chapter 3 in this volume), consistently feeling positive emotions when making moral rather than selfish decisions (Malti, Keller, & Buckman, 2012), and some measure of moral expertise (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). Damon and his colleagues have recently argued for a research focus on the development of purpose in adolescence—a kind of coherent moral commitment that would seem to be a developmental prerequisite to a fully-formed moral identity (Damon & Malin, Chapter 7 in this volume).

Focusing not only on the individual personality characteristics of adolescents, Hart and colleagues have developed a model of moral identity development that also emphasizes broad social factors (Hart, Chapter 31 in this volume). For example, Hart and Matsuba (2009) found that volunteering in adolescence is dependent on an interaction between poverty and the proportion of children to adults within a community. In American communities with low rates of poverty, there is more youth volunteering as the ratio of children to adults goes up. In communities with high rates of poverty, however, there is more youth volunteering as this ratio goes down. Their argument, in short, is that moral engagement and development of moral identity depend not only on characteristics of the individual but also on social contexts.

Much of the research on moral identity and exemplars has been conducted in the United States. Hardy and Carlo (2011) have called for research on the role of culture, including among diverse groups within the United States. In this regard, findings by King, Mueller, and Furrow (2013) on the cultural issues involved in research with exemplars is illuminating (see also King, Schnitker, & Houlberg, Chapter 32 in this volume). They find that there is cultural variation on criteria for having attained moral identity and exemplarity and that methods commonly used in this line of research, such as one-on-one interviews, are not equivalent in their familiarity and meaning across cultures. Thus, King and colleagues encourage collaboration between researchers and local leaders in cultural communities to better contextualize findings and ensure that generalizations rest on valid theoretical and methodological approaches.

In sum, theory and research on moral identity is burgeoning. Additional future attention to culture in this area could open up to fruitful research directions. Given cultural variation in the ways that the life course is partitioned and the key purposes assigned to each phase, one might expect an interaction of development and culture in moral identity. Probably the oldest known conception of the life course is in the Dharmashastras, the sacred law books of the Hindu religion. First written about 3,000 years ago, the Dharmashastras continue to hold sway in the everyday lives of Indians (Kakar, 1998). For instance, the third stage of vanaprastha in the Hindu Indian life course begins in middle adulthood and literally means “forest bound.” It entails moral ideals of gradual disengagement from social responsibilities and material attachments in order to focus on contemplative spiritual pursuits. According to Saraswathi, Mistry, and Dutta (2011), the ideals of this stage find behavioral expression among Indian adults who, upon reaching 60 years of age, either pass on their property to their children or let them know of their will and also in the “throngs” of older adults who worship at temples during early morning and late evening prayers. This example indicates how
indigenous notions of developmental moral ideals raise useful research questions for future scholarship on moral identity. These include the extent to which moral identity is (1) based in personality or social roles, (2) reshaped and redefined at different points across the entire life course, and (3) inclusive or exclusive of various material and immaterial self-interests.

The Cultural-Developmental Approach

The intersection between development and culture is explicitly addressed by the cultural-developmental approach. This theory focuses on how life course developmental trajectories for diverse kinds of moral reasoning vary across cultures (e.g., Jensen, 2008, 2012, 2015b). The cultural-developmental approach introduces the concept of a "template." The template charts trajectories across the life course for three kinds of reasoning: Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity (Jensen, 1995, 2015b). The trajectories are proposed as a template in the sense that they are somewhat flexible rather than fixed. Specifically, the emergence in childhood of each of the three ethics as well as their slopes of development from childhood through adulthood depend on the prevalence of the ethics within a culture. For example, if an ethic is highly common within a culture, it is likely that reasoning in terms of this ethic will emerge early in childhood and that children will swiftly come to make frequent use of the ethic.

The three ethics were based on a review of research across diverse cultures and constitute a broader definition of morality than those provided by the cognitive-development or domain approaches (Shweder, 1990). Briefly, the Ethic of Autonomy involves a focus on persons as individuals. Moral reasons within this ethic include the interests, well-being, and rights of individuals (self or other) and fairness between individuals. The Ethic of Community focuses on persons as members of social groups, with attendant reasons such as duty to others and concern with the customs, interests, and welfare of groups. The Ethic of Divinity focuses on persons as spiritual or religious entities, and reasons encompass divine and natural law, sacred lessons, and spiritual purity.

Findings utilizing interviews and questionnaires have shown the presence and reliable differentiation of the three ethics among diverse age and cultural groups (Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001; DiBianca Fasoli, in press; Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Haidt et al., 1993; Hickman, 2014; Jensen, 2008, 2011, 2015c, 2015d; Jensen & Padilla-Walker, 2015; Padilla-Walker & Jensen, 2016; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Vainio, 2015; Vasquez et al., 2001). Measurements of the three ethics assess the degree to which a person uses each ethic and also allow for analysis of specific types of reasons used within an ethic. For example, the coding manual for open-ended oral or written responses differentiates 13 to 16 types for each ethic, such as "Self's Psychological Well-Being" and "Rights" for Autonomy, "Duty to Others" and "Social Order or Harmony Goals" for Community, and "Scriptural Authority" and "God-Given Conscience" for Divinity (Jensen, 2015c). The differentiation of types of reasons within each ethic facilitates comprehensive coding of all of a person's moral reasons, including the valid assessment of diverse reasons utilized by persons of different ages and cultural backgrounds.

Figure 13.3A shows the template of life course trajectories for the Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. Based on a synthesis of a large set of findings across research approaches (Jensen, 2008), the argument is that Ethic of Autonomy reasoning emerges early in
childhood. The degree to which persons use this ethic stays relatively stable across adolescence and into adulthood, although there may be some decline in adulthood in cultures where there is a strong push for collectivity or submission to divinity. Furthermore, the argument is that the specific types of Autonomy reasons that persons use are likely to change with age. For example, findings have shown that, from early on, children in different cultures focus on harm to the self and the interests of the self (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Walker, 1989) as well as the needs and interests of other individuals (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). As persons in different cultures grow into adolescence and adulthood, some consideration of the welfare of the self and other individuals remains (Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & Van Court, 1995; Vasquez et al., 2001; Walker et al., 1995). Adolescents and adults, however, also begin to speak of reasons such as individual rights and equity in a consistent manner—even if these do not prevail across cultures (Killen, 2002; Miller & Luthar, 1989; Walker, 1989; Zimba, 1994).

According to the cultural-developmental approach, the Ethic of Community rises across the life course, both in degree of usage and diversity of types of reasons. For example, findings have consistently indicated that younger children in diverse cultures invoke Community reasons such as family interests and customs (Kohlberg, 1984; Miller et al., 1990; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Thompson, 2012). Moral reasoning related to the family is likely to rise in the course of adolescence and adulthood as a person’s awareness of and experiences with diverse types of family considerations increase, such as duty to family in addition to family interests and customs (Miller et al., 1990). By late childhood and adolescence, Community reasons that pertain to social groups other than the family are added (Carlo, 2006; Whiting & Edwards, 1988), including concern with friends, peers, and authority figures in places such as school and work (Schlegel, 2011). Cross-sectional and longitudinal findings have shown that by late adolescence or adulthood even more Community reasons are invoked, such as a focus on societal organization (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Eisenberg et al., 2002; Nisan, 1987; Walker, 1989; Zimba, 1994).

Turning to the Ethic of Divinity, the cultural-developmental proposal is that its use will often be low among children but will rise in adolescence and become similar to adult use (Jensen, 2008). This potential infusion of divinity reasoning in adolescence may especially characterize religious cultures that emphasize scriptural authority or where people conceive of supernatural entities as largely distinct from humans, such as omniscient and omnipotent. The reason is that these culturally articulated religious concepts are of such an abstract nature that they may be readily translated into moral reasoning only by adolescents whose cognitive skills allow for more abstraction than those of younger children (Trommsdorff, 2012).

As mentioned, the life course trajectories in Figure 13.3A constitute a malleable template. The cultural-developmental approach emphasizes that development and culture co-modulate and that there is a need to know not only about ontogeny but also culture in order to make reasonably
specific predictions about developmental trajectories. For example, research has
found that religiously conservative adults in the United States reason substantially
in terms of the Ethics of Divinity and Community, but de-emphasize the Ethic of
Autonomy. Religiously liberal adults, in comparison, emphasize the Ethics of
Autonomy and Community, but not Divinity (DiBianca Fasoli, in press; Jensen,
2008; McAdams et al., 2008). These findings on the different hierarchies of ethics
translate into different expectations for developmental trajectories of moral reason-
ing within the two religious cultures (Jensen, 2008). Within religiously liberal
groups, as illustrated in Figure 13.3B, the expectation is that children, adolescents,
and adults frequently will use the Ethic of Autonomy. Community reasons will be
rarer among children but will then become quite common among adolescents and
adults. Divinity will be used infrequently at all ages, and, if it emerges, this will only
occur in the course of adolescence. Figure 13.3C shows predictions for reli-
giously conservative groups. The expectation is that these children, adolescents, and
adults will use Autonomy infrequently. There may be some decrease over the life
span because of the strong emphasis on renouncing self-interest among religious
conservatives. With respect to Community,

the expectation is that its prevalence will rise steadily from childhood to reach a high
level in adulthood. The Ethic of Divinity will be low among children but will then
rise markedly in adolescence and remain high throughout adulthood.

Findings have provided support for the cultural-developmental approach while also
pointing to future research topics. The Ethic of Autonomy has indeed been found to be
somewhat lower among adults than children and adolescents in both India, where there
is an emphasis on familism and communalism, and among religiously conservative
American communities, where submission to divinity is paramount (Hickman &
DiBianca Fasoli, 2015; Jensen, 2015a; Jensen & McKenzie, 2016; Kapadia &
Bhangalakar, 2015). Among religiously liberal Americans, recent findings show an
emphasis on the Ethic of Autonomy across the life course, as predicted by the cultural-
developmental approach. However, rather than the predicted steady trajectory across
the life course, findings also indicated a decline from childhood into adulthood
(Jensen & McKenzie, 2016). This is rather striking since developmental theorists of
moral development, from Piaget to Kohlberg to Turiel, have positioned Autonomy
reasoning at the endpoint of moral development. After all these years, it seems that
room remains for more examination of the actual extent of adult use of the Ethic
of Autonomy—even in cultures where Autonomy is prevalent.

The Ethic of Autonomy does appear to be particularly high among people in their late teens and 20s who live in cultures where there is a period of emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2015). Emerging adulthood is characterized by a focus on individual identity, decision-making, and choice. The primacy of the Ethic of Autonomy during this age period was observed by Guerra and Giner-Sorolla (2015) in four of the five cultures they examined. Emerging adults reasoned more in terms of Autonomy than the Ethics of Community and Divinity in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The interesting, if not entirely surprising, exception was Japan, where Autonomy was tied with Community. Hickman and DiBianca Fasoli (2015) also found that among Hmong immigrants to the United States, emerging adults emphasized the Ethic of Autonomy whereas their parents did not. As they poignantly explain, “they are dealing with the competing demands of Hmong moral models handed to them by their parents and relatives versus those that are more prevalent in American society (such as their non-Hmong peers) and more typical of American emerging adults.” Finally, even among American Latter Day Saint (or Mormon) emerging adults, Padilla-Walker and Nelson (2015) have found evidence for considerable attention to the Ethic of Autonomy, even as the Ethic of Divinity was generally rated as more important.

The Ethic of Community, as predicted by the cultural-developmental approach, has been found to be higher among adults than children and adolescents. This was the case in recent research with Indian participants (Kapadia & Bhangaokar, 2015) and among both religiously liberal and conservative participants in the United States (Jensen & McKenzie, 2016). There is a need, however, for more research. The findings are cross-sectional. They are also limited to three cultural groups, even if those are notably diverse.

With respect to the Ethic of Divinity, the thesis that an infusion of divinity reasoning takes place in adolescence in religious cultures that emphasize scriptural authority and abstract conceptions of the supernatural has found support in a comparison of American evangelical children, adolescents, and adults (Jensen & McKenzie, 2016). DiBianca Fasoli (in press), too, observed low use of the Ethic of Divinity among American evangelical children but high use among their parents, and she surmises that adolescence must be where the shift occurs. DiBianca Fasoli conducted a micro-linguistic analysis of parent–child conversations and found that parents regularly sought to reroute their children’s reasoning from Ethic of Autonomy to Ethic of Divinity considerations. Thus, the findings illustrate the co-modulation of moral development and culture as well as a communicative process within the family whereby that co-modulation takes place.

In sum, the cultural-developmental approach provides a new conceptual approach to moral psychology. Research findings support a co-modulation of ontogeny and culture in the development of moral reasoning. There is a need for longitudinal and sequential research on the cultural-developmental trajectories to better understand the complementary roles of ontogenetic development and culture. It would also be useful for future work to further examine intersections among the three ethics in development and behavior (for one such study, see Padilla-Walker & Nelson, 2015), as well as diverse processes whereby each of the three ethics is either promoted or suppressed in the course of development. Future research could also fruitfully address connections between
the cultural-developmental approach and identity theory. For example, one might expect that a person who has arrived at a certain constellation of ethics that is applied across an array of moral issues (i.e., a moral identity) would be particularly likely to experience fluctuation in this constellation of ethics during periods of developmental change (e.g., moving from one phase of the life course to another) and during periods of cultural change (e.g., within a culture as a whole or in the context of moving from one culture to another).

Conclusions and Implications for Future Research

Three Promising Directions

This chapter has proposed future research possibilities for each of the major approaches described. Here, I turn to three overarching future directions on the development of moral reasoning.

FROM ORIGINS TO OLD AGE

Recent theory on moral development has been characterized by a search for cognitions and emotions that constitute foundations of moral behavior. This search has often focused on biological foundations through evolutionary and neuroscience research and on early developmental foundations through research with infants and young children (for reviews, see Bloom, 2013; Thompson, 2012). Babies do indeed show a variety of moral sensibilities (Bloom, 2013; Vaish & Tomasello, 2014), but they are not particularly diverse in their morality. As should be clear from the present review of findings, however, adults from different cultures are diverse. There is increasing multiplicity with development. This means that it is insufficient to reach conclusions about moral development based on research with children, let alone infants and toddlers.

Life span research is necessary. For example, we need to ask: To what extent do early moral reasons remain, change, or disappear? To what extent does new moral reasoning emerge later in life? Does the dialectic between moral reasoning and behavior change with development—given the facts that adults generally provide more moral reasons than children and adolescents and that adults are more likely to have developed a moral identity. How do the processes that drive moral development change over the course of the life course?

FROM INTRAPERSONAL TO INTERPERSONAL MORAL REASONING

For decades, moral reasoning research has focused on the development of intrapersonal moral reasoning. Much of this research used hypothetical moral dilemmas and vignettes in an effort to uncover the structure of an individual’s reasoning. Future research, however, might fruitfully pay more attention to the interpersonal side of moral reasoning. For example, a recent study asked American children, adolescents, and adults from religiously liberal and conservative communities to reason about two kinds of issues, “public” moral issues where they rendered judgments for people in general and “private” moral experiences where they evaluated their own behavior (Jensen & McKenzie, 2016). One striking finding was that moral reasoning was dependent on the nature of the issue. Conservatives frequently used Ethic of Divinity reasoning, and more so for public than private issues. Liberals only invoked the Ethic of Divinity in contemplation of private issues. Thus, religious conservatives and liberals diverge on what they think should be a moral lingua franca of society. To conservatives, but not liberals, the Ethic of Divinity is a kind of reasoning that is acceptable and persuasive in an interpersonal context.
Future research might fruitfully examine how the development of moral reasoning in humans involves intra- and interpersonal dialogical processes. Morality in part is a process where we have internal dialogues with some distinct private moral reasons for weighing our behaviors. Morality is also a social process where we dialogue, debate, and argue with others. We do this person-to-person, such as between a parent and a child. We also do this at the level of groups, such as within the public sphere.

GLOBALIZATION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Globalization is more prominent than ever due to trade, travel, migration, and the spread of media. While globalization indeed is a worldwide phenomenon, it is more prominent in developed than developing countries and in urban than rural areas. Adolescents and emerging adults may also be more open to globalization than children or adults (Jensen, in press). With globalization there is a rise in the moral messages to which a person is exposed.

A recent study of adolescent-parent dyads in rural and urban Thailand suggests how globalization impacts moral reasoning (McKenzie, 2018). In the rural area, adolescents and parents spent a lot of time together in the family and village context. In discussing moral issues, the rural adolescents and parents were similar in their use of the three Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. They especially emphasized Ethic of Community considerations. In the urban city, media and global commerce is prominent, and adolescents and parents also spent less time together. Compared to the rural dyads, the urban ones reasoned more in terms of the Ethic of Autonomy and less in terms of the Ethic of Community. Globalization appears to have opened up a gap between the two Thai communities in contexts and moral reasoning even if they are a mere 25 miles apart. There was also a gap among the urban dyads, with adolescents speaking more of Autonomy and less of Community than did their parents. Whereas urban parents used Autonomy and Community reasoning roughly equally, urban adolescents' moral reasoning was dominated by the Ethic of Autonomy. Thus, although urban adolescents and their parents both live in a globalizing cultural community, their level of exposure and developmental openness to experiences with globalization differed, as reflected in their moral reasoning.

Today's children and adolescents growing up in urban areas all over the world typically are exposed to moral messages from many sources: parents, peers, after-school counselors, extracurricular activity coaches, television, magazines, websites, and so forth. Adults, too, are exposed to myriad local and global contexts. What moral messages do these sources convey? To what extent do the messages reinforce or work against one another? These are important questions for future research. Meanwhile, in a number of areas of the world, especially rural and poor ones, the social contexts are different. Children's daily access to mass media is much less pronounced. Adolescents, especially girls, are far less likely to attend secondary educational institutions. Adults spend little time involved in the global economy. Children, adolescents, and adults in rural communities spend more time in the contexts of family and small communities. What are the implications for their moral development?

Certainly, globalization does involve a massive and powerful movement of Western images, people, and ideas—including moral ones—to the rest of the world. But the flow also runs in the other direction. As scholars have pointed out, globalization may be met with a variety of individual and group responses, from resistance to new ideas, to
wholehearted assimilation of the new ideas, to integration or hybridization of multiple kinds of ideas (Giddens, 1990; Hermans, 2016; Jensen & Arnett, 2012). A focus specifically on how these processes come into play in moral reasoning is timely.

Conclusion
Moral development researchers have sometimes aspired to provide moral prescriptions. Kohlberg (1981) asserted that his stage sequence was simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive of moral development. It seems no mere coincidence that he published *The Philosophy of Moral Development* (1981) before *The Psychology of Moral Development* (1984). But therein also lies the problematic issue that letting one strict philosophical definition of morality determine psychological research is bound to leave out the emic and diverse features of people’s moral lives. Of course, the other side of the matter is that detailed descriptive, explanatory, and predictive accounts of these emic and diverse features do not in and of themselves lead to unambiguous policy. As should be clear from the preceding review, research approaches vary on how clearly and explicitly they are aimed at prescription and policy.

Moving from description to prescription requires what I—with a nod to my Danish compatriot Søren Kierkegaard—would call a “leap of philosophy.” As we conduct research on moral reasoning and development in a global world, we will need to give increasingly careful consideration to the extent to which we are making such a leap—implicitly or explicitly. We would probably also do well—and here I am leaping—to appreciate that even as approaches to moral reasoning and development differ, they may still make contributions to the collective scientific enterprise. Certainly, the field has moved away from the dominance and use of one kind of approach. My closing “ought” is that the field should welcome a new focus on the plural definitions, developmental pathways, and contexts that children, adolescents, and adults experience with respect to morality.

References


perspective (pp. 141–169). New York: Cambridge University Press.


King, P. E., Mueller, R. O., & Furrow, J. F. (2013). Cultural and contextual considerations in


