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The Cultural-Developmental Approach to Moral Psychology:

Autonomy, Community, and Divinity Across Cultures and Ages

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ABSTRACT

This article details the cultural-developmental approach to moral psychology. This conceptual framework lays out life course "templates" for the three Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. These life course trajectories are not fixed but accommodate to cultural variability by addressing: 1) whether or not an Ethic emerges, 2) when it emerges, and 3) the slope and specific characteristics of its development. As described, the formulation of the cultural-developmental approach was based on a large body of longstanding research findings, as well as my research with religiously conservative and liberal groups divided by the so-called "culture wars." Recent research has also extended the cultural-developmental hypotheses, and validated new measures of the three Ethics. The conclusion proposes future research directions for moral psychology, and the application of the conceptual idea of cultural-developmental templates to other areas of psychology.

Keywords: Cultural-developmental approach, psychology, moral, template, culture, culture wars, development, life course, ethics, autonomy, community, divinity,

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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, an argument for multiplicity has gained traction in the study of human psychology. Instead of a focus on one kind of self, one kind of intelligence, and one kind of creativity, for example, researchers have described multiple selves (Kağitçibaşi, 2015; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nsamenang, 2011), intelligences (Hein, Reich, & Grigorenko, 2015; Gardner, 1993; Sternberg, 1985), and creativities (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Lubart, 1999; Mourgues, Barbot, Tan, & Grigorenko, 2015). Moral psychology, too, has seen calls for the inclusion of more than one kind of moral reasoning (Colby & Damon, 1992, Damon & Colby, 2015; Dien, 1982; Gilligan, 1982; Miller, 1989; Shweder, 1990), in lieu of conceptualizations of morality as a unitary structure (Kohlberg, 1984) or domain (Turiel, 1983). More often than not, the arguments for multiplicity have been inspired by consideration of culturally diverse individuals and groups.

What has so far received less attention is the development, from childhood into adulthood, of some of these multiplicitous psychological phenomena. This is because it takes time to build knowledge about new constructs, such as "interdependent self" (Triandis, 1995), "naturalistic intelligence" (Gardner, 2004), "spiritually-oriented creativity" (Lubart & Sternberg, 1998), and "Ethic of Community" (Shweder, 1990; Jensen, 1995). It also takes novel theoretical thinking to capture the development of a multiplicitous phenomenon (Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003; Jensen, 2011a, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2015a). Additionally, when it comes to policy, it may seem more straightforward to work towards one goal than to figure out how to select or balance among two or more.

Nonetheless, a new focus in moral psychology is how the development of diverse kinds of reasoning occurs across the life course, and the extent to which developmental trajectories vary across cultures. This is the focus of the theory known as the "cultural-developmental approach" (Jensen, 2008, 2011b, 2011c, 2015b). This approach charts trajectories across the life course for three kinds of moral reasoning, the Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity.

The cultural-developmental approach is not a one-size-fits-all model, however. The developmental trajectories are proposed as a *template.* Specifically, they accommodate the different hierarchies of the Ethics held by culturally diverse peoples. Thus, as described below, each of the three Ethics emerges at different points in childhood, varies somewhat on the slope and specific characteristics of its development, and reaches different endpoints in adulthood depending on the culture in question. The cultural-developmental approach, then, aims to capture how moral development and culture co-modulate. From this perspective, ontogenetic development is not determinative but nor is there a limitless cultural range.

The purpose of this article is to review the theoretical constituents of the cultural-developmental approach, along with research findings and measurement instruments generated by the approach. Thus, Sections II and III describe how the formulation of the cultural-developmental approach to moral psychology emerged, in part, on the basis of my ethnographic, interview, and questionnaire research with members of religiously conservative and liberal cultures over the course of the last couple of decades. The differentiation between these two groups within the United States has also been referred to as the "culture wars." Section IV details how findings on moral development from several other research traditions also informed the cultural-developmental approach (Jensen, 2008, 2011b). In section V, an overview is provided of recent studies across cultures and age groups that have tested and extended the cultural-

developmental hypotheses (e.g., Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Jensen & McKenzie, 2016; Kapadia & Bhangaokar, 2015; Padilla-Walker & Nelson, 2015; Vainio, 2015). Some of these studies have also involved the development of new measurements of the three ethics. In sections VI and VII, I conclude with suggestions for future moral psychology research, and the application of the conceptual idea of cultural-developmental templates to other areas of psychology.

II. BACKGROUND:

CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN "CULTURE WARS"

Two decades ago, culture had become a buzzword in psychological and sociological research—albeit in rather different ways. In the area of psychology, a field of "cultural psychology" was coming into its own. Meanwhile, sociological research gave rise to the concept of an American "culture wars."

The field of cultural psychology, as it took shape and gained momentum around the 1990s, included scholars from disciplines such as anthropology, communications, education, linguistics, psychology, social work, and neuroscience. Many of their efforts have gone into naming and defining a discipline, and generating research that demonstrates how culture is a crucial constituent of human psychology and development (e.g., Cole, 1996; Gelfand & Diener, 2010; Goodnow, Miller & Kessel, 1995; Gutchess & Boduroglu, 2015; Greenfield, 1997; Heine, 2008; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Miller, 1999; Moghaddam, 1987; Nisbett, 2003; Nsamenang, 1992; Rogoff, 2003; Saraswathi, 2005; Shore, 1996; Super & Harkness, 2002; Stigler, Shweder & Herdt, 1990; Valsiner, 1987).

The hallmark of cultural psychology is the aim of understanding the psychologies of different peoples by means of culturally sensitive theories and methods. Psychological findings

showing cultural differences are taken to be just as important and useful as findings showing cultural similarities (Jensen, 2012b).

It is important to note that cultural psychologists commonly define culture as symbolic and behavioral inheritances constructed and institutionalized by members of a community (Goodnow, 2010). Symbolic inheritances involve conceptions of persons, society, nature, and divinity. Behavioral inheritances consist of habitual familial and social practices. As scholars have long observed, cultural communities include heterogeneity among groups and individuals. Variation also exists between cultural communities, including on their degree of heterogeneity, inter-group contest, and change over time (Whiting & Edwards, 1988). Culture, then, is not synonymous with country or ethnicity but rather describes communities whose members share key beliefs and behaviors. For example, research on religious cultures falls within the purview of cultural psychology.

This brings us to the American "culture wars." Sociologists have for some time noted that a modern bifurcation has occurred within Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant denominations in the United States, and even in American culture more broadly (e.g., Bellah, 1987; Fleishman, 1988; Jones, Cox, Navarro-Rivera, Dionne Jr., & Galston, 2012; Merelman, 1984; Wuthnow, 1989). Scholars vary on what they name the two sides. One side has been described with terms such as religiously conservative, fundamentalist, and orthodox. Religiously liberal, modernist, mainline, and progressivist are examples of designations applied to the other side. As might be expected, sociologists and scholars from other disciplines who address this division recognize complex overlap between the two sides.

A variety of historical accounts indicate that signs of this split can be traced back to the 18th century in the United States, but that the rupture between the so-called "fundamentalist" and

"modernist" movements in the late-19th and early-20th century was crucial in shaping the present division (Hunter, 1991; Marsden, 1980; Wuthnow, 1989). The fundamentalist movement involved, for example, the affirmation of the Bible as the inerrant word of God. The modernist movement, in contrast, called for a reinterpretation of Christianity based on scientific findings on matters such as evolution, and social problems arising from industrialization and urbanization.

Among Protestants, the term "mainline" came into use in the 1920s in the context of debates between fundamentalists and modernists (Walsh, 2000). Mainline Protestant refers to churches such as the American Baptist Churches, the Episcopal Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the Presbyterian Church (USA), and the United Methodist Church. Today, these and other churches often collaborate on social and political issues through ecumenical organizations, such as the National Council of Churches (National Council of Churches, 2016).

Mainline Protestant denominations, in the course of the 20th century, became differentiated from charismatic, evangelical, and fundamentalist Protestant denominations. Some churches within this latter grouping remain separatist, but here too there is contemporary parachurch collaboration (Hunter, 1991). For example, the National Association of Evangelicals includes such denominations as the Baptist General Conference, Churches of Christ in Christian Union, the Conservative Congregational Christian Conference, the Free Methodist Church of North America, the Open Bible Church, and the Presbyterian Church in America (PCA) (National Association of Evangelicals, 2016).

As noted, the modern bifurcation experienced by Protestant churches in the United States echoes tendencies also seen among Catholics and Jews, and in American culture more broadly (e.g., Bellah, 1987; Fleishman, 1988; Jones, Cox, Navarro-Rivera, Dionne Jr., & Galston, 2012;

Merelman, 1984; Wuthnow, 1989). The bifurcation has often found passionate expression in public debates, in fact, to the point where it was coined the American "culture wars" in the early 1990s (Hunter, 1991)—a term that has remained in common use (e.g., Martin, 2014; New York Times Editorial, 2014).

Briefly, those who are religious conservative, fundamentalist, or orthodox share a commitment to a transcendent authority—an authority that is regarded as independent of, prior to, and more powerful than human experience. In their view, this transcendent authority originated a definitive moral code and revealed it to human beings. Different religious traditions have different conceptions of the sources through which transcendence communicates its authority (for example, Jews look to the Torah and the community that upholds it, Protestants look to the Old and New Testaments). Contemporary society, in this view, is rapidly drifting away from God's truth, as individuals are allowed excessive freedoms to follow their desires. This contemporary waywardness is manifest, for example, in decreased emphasis on parental authority over children, and blurring of roles and statuses for women and men.

In contrast, religious liberals, modernists, and progressivists tend to regard moral truth as subject to change and progress. In their view, moral precepts are not revealed once and for all by a transcendent authority, but may be altered as human and individual understandings unfold, and as society changes. Thus they are more accepting of some measure of moral pluralism, compared to those who are fundamentalist, orthodox, and religiously conservative. They are also more accepting of individual choices (e.g., Bellah, 1987; Hunter, 1991; Wuthnow, 1989).

Thus, religious liberals, modernists, and progressivists tend toward what has been termed "loose-bounded" communities (Merelman, 1984; see also Gelfand et al., 2011, Harrington & Gelfand, 2014). These communities place loose boundaries on individuals' behaviors, and

consequently a broad range of behaviors find expression within the community. In comparison, the religious conservative, fundamentalist, or orthodox conception of community places stricter behavioral requirements upon individuals. Some roles, statuses, and social bonds are binding with relatively little room for individual alteration. In this way, these conservative groups tend toward what has been termed "tight-bounded" communities.

"Culture wars," translated by Hunter (1991, p.xii) from the German *Kulturkampf*, is a striking term. It is also rather muscular. There is after all not an armed conflict in the United States, and divisive public debates may obscure more subtle and complex individual convictions and psychologies. Most of the sociological and historical analyses described above have focused on organizations and their leaders. In contrast, my research has focused on the worldviews and moral psychology of lay believers.

In my research, as will be described shortly, I have worked with a variety of religious denominations that fall on different sides of the "culture wars" divide. I will often refer to research participants as religiously "conservative" and "liberal," on the assumption that these are indeed religious cultures that can be differentiated in a meaningful way. And in fact, as we will see, they do hold markedly different worldviews and moral outlooks. Nonetheless, it bears repeating that of course there is variation between religious groups—such as Baptists, or evangelical Presbyterians, or orthodox Jews—that are designated as religiously conservative. The same applies to the religiously liberal side. In describing specific religious congregations and their worship practices, I typically refer to them by the terms they use, such as fundamentalist Baptist.

III. RESEARCH WITH RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL
LAY BELIEVERS

As far as I am aware, there had been no psychological research on the culture wars when I first began to conduct my research. At the time, psychological research on religious issues was rare—even somewhat shunned by virtue of longstanding convictions that religion masks deeper moral thinking processes (Piaget, 1932) and, in any event, would soon constitute a bygone human illusion (Freud, 1927). At the time, too, cultural psychology research often involved comparisons of peoples from different nations, rather than groups of the same nationality. Inspired by the hallmarks of cultural psychology, though, I decided to use multiple methods, and to analyze the moral reasoning of members of religiously conservative and liberal cultures in terms of a coding scheme that did not presume uniformity of thought.

A. ETHNOGRAPHY: ATTENDING CHURCH

For a couple of years, I attended five different Baptist churches, one large mainline church and four smaller ones that self-identify as fundamentalist. After initially visiting some twenty churches of various denominations, I decided on the five Baptist churches that seemed good candidates for a comparison of religiously liberal and conservative congregations. Five churches were included in the ethnographic phase in order to have enough of a pool of congregants for subsequent interview and questionnaire research. The churches were located in central Missouri, an area where smaller cities and towns, suburbs, and rural patches are puzzled together.

Once I had decided on the five Baptist churches, I met with pastors to obtain their permissions to attend their churches as a researcher, and to ask if they would author a letter to their congregants endorsing the interview and questionnaire components of my study. All pastors readily agreed. I promised to aim to capture the beliefs and behaviors of congregants in a way

that they would clearly recognize, even if they might not share my terminology and research vantage point. I also promised to make my findings and writings readily available.

I attended church services two times on Sundays and once on Wednesday evenings (a common Baptist service time). Additionally, I also joined a wide variety of church community events on other days across the five churches. Typically, I arrived early and stayed late to converse with congregation members.

When I entered through church doors, I sought to follow congregation norms as much as possible. I participated fully in worship greetings, singing, recital of prayers, and so on. In most of the fundamentalist churches where women wore skirts, not trousers, I would follow suit—so to speak. In fundamentalist churches where members bring their own bibles, I too would bring one. I did not take part in communion, however, since it is a practice that at least in fundamentalist churches presupposes having proclaimed one's faith in Christ.

The service programs across the five churches included many of the same elements, and even followed much the same order: Pastor's welcome and greetings, invocation, prayer, scriptural readings, hymns, pastor's sermon, offertory, invitation to declare one's faith, and benediction. This traditional structural commonality did not, however, entail similar worldviews and moral messages.

Subtle behaviors conveyed profound ideological differences between the liberal and conservative churches. With respect to the bible, for example, it was not only that fundamentalist congregation members would bring their own. Their bibles were stuffed with strips of paper, scribbled notes, and post-its—reflecting frequent and careful study. Many women, and some men, kept their bibles in cloth carriers that were elaborately embroidered or quilted—reflecting considerable care. Also, unlike the mainline church, the fundamentalist ones would never type

page numbers in the programs for where to find biblical passages, a situation that caused me considerable initial chagrin and fear of embarrassment. The absence of page numbers may partly be because fundamentalist congregation members do not all bring the same version of the bible but, more importantly, it undoubtedly signals the deep knowledge of the bible expected in churches where scriptures are taken to denote divine will.

How behavioral responsibilities were distributed also differentiated the two kinds of religious communities in telling ways. Service activities and rituals at the mainline Baptist church were performed by women and men, as well as children and adults. An attempt to encourage the participation of all individuals was evident from the first to the last moment of service. For example, both women and men served as church greeters, led invocations, and recited scripture verses from the pulpit. Also, both women and men spoke to the congregation about fund raising drives, served as ushers, and provided guidance to persons who made known their intent to join the church during the end-of-service invitation. Children, too, were involved side-by-side with adults. For example, youth groups performed musical arrangements. Also, services often included children's sermons, where children—and the occasional small group of jesting adolescents—came to the front of the church to chat with the pastor about diverse topics. Both children and adolescents also served as ushers—another practice that on occasion rendered events less than formal with children merrily chewing gum or forgetting the protocol. The involvement in the worship service of members across age and gender signals that hierarchy between children and adults, and women and men is de-emphasized. There is instead encouragement of individual expression, equality, and inclusiveness.

In the fundamentalist churches, congregation members participated in service rituals and activities with exuberance and enthusiasm, but all members did not partake equally in

responsibilities. Both women and men sang in the choir, gave witness, and came to the front of the church to kneel and pray. Women, however, did not serve as church greeters or ushers, lead in prayer, or speak from the pulpit on matters of faith. This division of gender roles within the churches is one manifestation of a conservative worldview that prescribes gender role divisions in many areas of life—church, family, and society. Also, children and adolescents had virtually no responsibility for service activities and rituals. They did not typically perform musical arrangements. They did not serve as ushers. There were no children's sermons. In fact, children were sometimes dismissed to various classes during service. It was primarily at special times, such as Christmas, that children were actively involved through musical and theatrical performances. In one church, a children's Christmas play featured the conversion of Kermit the Frog from hedonism to fundamentalism—in a rendition that seemed pretty far from Jim Henson's otherwise vivid imagination. The fundamentalist division of church labor conveys a hierarchical worldview in terms of the relations between adults and children, men and women, pastor and parishioners, and—of course—God and humans.

Apart from parishioners' behaviors, pastors' sermons also conveyed the different values and worldviews that guide these religiously conservative and liberal communities. Naturally, the subjects of pastors' sermons varied and pertained to a wide variety of issues. In an analysis of themes across about a hundred sermons, however, three consistent messages emerged in the fundamentalist Baptist ministers' sermons (Jensen, 1997a, 2015c). These pertained to sin, salvation, and evangelizing. The sinfulness of human nature and the sinfulness of the present world were consistent concerns. In the words of two pastors, "lust" and proneness to "temptation" are ineradicably part of human nature. Moreover, this day and age is a time when lust is promoted rather than curtailed. For example, one pastor in a sermon spoke of how present

day media and laws encourage sinful behaviors. Focusing upon "sexual lusts," he argued that our current society promotes promiscuity which in turn has led to the evils of abortion and sexually transmitted diseases. In his and the other pastors' view, we must refrain from giving in to temptations—sexual or otherwise. We must "do battle" against temptation in our individual lives and in society.

The goal of salvation was another consistent theme of the pastors' sermons. They often spoke of the goal of becoming saved. They explained that only through faith and a personal commitment to Christ can humans enter heaven. When we "receive" Christ, we experience a new birth. The pastors emphasize that being saved means that we strive to become righteous and "Christ-like" in this world, for example by battling temptation. It also means that after this world we are ensured of entry into heaven.

The third consistent theme of the pastors' sermons was the necessity of evangelizing. The fundamentalist pastors conceive of evangelizing as a first step toward a person's salvation. It is a dead serious task—literally—aimed at saving family members, friends, acquaintances, and strangers from the fires of hell and granting them entry into a glorious heaven. In sermons, the pastors repeatedly invoked the necessity of evangelizing in the course of one's daily life. They also provided favorable depictions of missionary life. In one sermon, for example, the pastor described missionary work as an arduous but noble endeavor. He explained that missionaries must sever their ties to their homes and families—they must be willing to "go anywhere, bear any burden, and sever any tie." Yet, the lives of missionaries are ennobled by the fact that their tie to God is fortified. In the words of the pastor, God becomes: "my all, my life." The pastors' sermons on sin, salvation, and evangelizing indicate the centrality of divine authority and the

divine realm in the religiously conservative worldview. In this psychologically powerful view, the self has a divine purpose.

The mainline pastor's top three themes were different from those of the fundamentalist ministers, as was the underlying worldview and moral messages revealed by the themes. The first prominent theme in the mainline church was the importance of respecting diverse people and their rights. The pastor's sermons sometimes included general statements to the effect that his church welcomes all persons and does not require uniformity. At times he contrasted this to the "pushy closed-mindedness" of more conservative congregations. At the more specific level, the pastor spoke, for example, of the necessity of supporting the rights of sexual minorities.

A second prominent sermon theme pertained to caring for both self and others. This theme was given an imaginative elaboration in one sermon when the pastor spoke of the danger of falling into the "messiah trap." As he explained it, this is the trap where one begins to fancy oneself a messiah. He described two ways in which one may get caught. One way is to think that one can create one's own religion and be entirely self-sufficient. The second messiah trap involves an exclusive devotion to the lives of others. It is the trap of sacrificing the self for others. The pastor, in essence, was calling for a delicate balance between individual and community considerations.

On the surface, the third theme preached by the mainline Baptist minister—evangelizing—overlapped with those of the fundamentalist ministers. Evangelizing is at the heart of Christian faith, and it is an imperative task of mainline Protestant congregations that are shrinking and aging (Pew Research Center, 2015). The mainline Baptist pastor often encouraged his parishioners to evangelize, but he was at pains to distance himself and his congregation from the kind of evangelizing carried out by evangelicals and fundamentalists. A telling sermon was

entitled: "Reframing the troublesome task." The task, of course, is evangelizing. According to the pastor, it is troublesome because his church must clearly distinguish itself from "Bible thumping fundamentalists" who push a "quasi-religio-politico" agenda that "eventually will defame our faith." In the pastor's view, the evangelizing approach of fundamentalists and others akin to them is "confrontational," "manipulative," and "simplistic." It seeks to convert persons into a faith that is "oppressive." In order to set themselves apart from this form of evangelizing and outlook, the pastor suggested that his church bury the word evangelizing and instead begin to employ the term "disciple making." He also suggested that two key concerns to be spoken of during "disciple making" should be those of justice and love.

The ethnographic research, then, contributes to an understanding that religious conservatives and liberals frame the moral self differently. To religious conservatives, the self has divine purpose in this world and the hereafter. The self may become godly, but humans are not on par with God. This hierarchical relationship between God and humans is one that also extends to and is mirrored in other relations between humans, including between men and women. To religious liberals, in comparison, the self is what might be termed a "social individual," whose primary purposes involve balancing care for self and for others, and treating all individuals in an equitable manner.

Furthermore, the ethnographic research demonstrates that the cultural clash between liberals and conservatives is quite potent. The mainline Baptist pastor's sermons unmistakably delineated the division, and portrayed the other side in antagonistic terms. Fundamentalist pastors, meanwhile, made their view plain that hell is for real, and that the modern world seems eager to get there as fast as possible. It is evident that the two sides are competing with each other to claim its own worldview as the better one.

B. INTERVIEWING CONGREGANTS

The ethnographic work provides insight into behaviors and beliefs as expressed in church. Aiming to delve deeper into individuals' moral judgments and reasoning, interviews with adult members of the congregations were conducted. Specifically, forty adults who were in midlife (35-55 years), half from the mainline congregation ($M = 48.6$, $SD = 6.8$) and half from the fundamentalist ones ($M = 42.9$, $SD = 6.9$), took part in interviews that addressed a variety of moral issues, including suicide in the case of terminal illness, divorce, and abortion (Jensen, 1997a, 1998a, 1998b). The issues were picked so as to pertain to matters of life and death, the family, and the roles of women and men. Sociologists and my ethnographic research had identified these as primary issues of contention between conservative and liberal religious cultures.

The adults' moral reasoning was coded in terms of the three Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. This tripartite differentiation was originally proposed by Shweder and his colleagues in recognition of diversity of moral concepts across cultures (Jensen, 1995; Shweder, 1990; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997).

Each ethic entails a different conception of the moral self. Briefly, the Ethic of Autonomy defines the self as an autonomous individual who is free to make choices, being restricted primarily by concerns with inflicting harm on other individuals and encroaching on their rights. Moral reasoning within this ethic centers on an individual's rights, interests, and well-being, and on equality between individuals. The Ethic of Community defines the moral self through membership in social groups such as family and nation, and responsibilities that ensue from this membership. Moral reasoning within this ethic includes a focus on a person's duties to others, and promoting the interests and welfare of groups to which the person belongs. The Ethic of

Divinity defines the self as a spiritual entity. Here, moral reasoning centers on divine and natural

law, injunctions and lessons found in sacred texts, and the striving on the part of a person to

avoid spiritual degradation and come closer to moral purity.

In the standard manual for coding oral and written moral reasoning (*Coding Manual:*

Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity, Jensen, 2015d), each reason is coded into one of

the three ethics, allowing for an assessment of the <u>degree</u> to which a person uses each of the

Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. Each reason is also coded into one of numerous

subcategories. The manual provides 13 to 16 subcategories for each ethic, such as "Self's

Psychological Well-Being" and "Rights" for Autonomy, "Duty to Others" and "Social Order or

Harmony Goals" for Community, and "Scriptural Authority" and "God-Given Conscience" for

Divinity. Table 1 shows all of the subcategories within each of the three ethics. (For the complete

manual, including definitions and examples for each subcategory, see Jensen 2015d). The use of

subcategories aids in ensuring careful and comprehensive coding of all of a person's moral

reasoning.

Importantly, coding for subcategories also allows assessment of the specific <u>type</u> of

moral concept used within an ethic. Distinguishing not only among the three ethics but also

among types means that highly diverse concepts can be given consideration. For example, the

Chinese concept of shame (Fung, 1999) and the Indian concept of role-based obligations (Miller,

1994) would both be coded into the Ethic of Community. However, they would be coded into the

different subcategories of "Community-Oriented Virtues" and "Duty to Others," respectively.

Likewise, a child's invocation of parental authority (Piaget, 1932) and an adult's concern with

social coordination (Zimba, 1994) would be coded as Ethic of Community reasons, but with the

former exemplifying the subcategory of an "Important Person's Authority" and the latter "Social

Order."

The analyses of the religiously conservative and liberal adults' moral reasoning showed

overlap, but also striking differences. As shown in Table 2, the groups were similar in making

frequent mention of the Ethic of Community. Liberals, however, reasoned significantly more in

terms of the Ethic of Autonomy than did religious conservatives. Meanwhile, the conservatives

reasoned more in terms of the Ethic of Divinity than did liberals. (For a complete discussion of

issues and all statistics, see Jensen 1998a, 1998b).

Listening to the interviewees, the differences in where the dial was set on their moral

compass was clear. In response to the issue of suicide in the case of terminal illness, for example,

a religiously conservative man said: "I leave that in God's hands. . . . He gave us life, He can take

the life when he wants to, and He can give us grace to go through difficulties in life while we're

here." In contrast, a liberal interviewee approached the issue from the vantage point of the

individual and the loss of autonomy. Rhetorically, she asked: "Who wants to lie in bed for even

one extra day of their life just to be alive, if they can't communicate, they can't eat by

themselves?"

C. SURVEYING CONGREGANTS

With the goal of seeing if the interview findings could be replicated and extended with a

larger sample, a questionnaire was constructed. The *Three Ethics Reasoning Assessment (TERA)*

assesses moral reasoning for a selection of moral issues, including abortion, divorce, and suicide

in the case of terminal illness. Table 3 provides an example of the format for the issue of suicide

in the case of terminal illness. TERA also allows participants to indicate exceptions to their

overall moral judgment of an issue (e.g., abortion is wrong, but not in cases of incest, rape, etc.). (For the complete version of TERA, see Jensen 2015e).

TERA was distributed to 120 respondents, sixty mainline and sixty fundamentalist Baptists. Each group included even numbers of young (19-27 years, $M = 23.2$, $SD = 0.58$), midlife (35-56 years, $M = 46.5$, $SD = 1.49$), and older adults (65-84 years, $M = 72.7$, $SD = 1.30$). Thus one goal was to see if the findings from the interviews with midlife adults would be replicated. A second goal was to compare age group. (In the Section that follows, this developmental focus will be further elaborated in regards to children, adolescents, and adults).

Table 4 shows that, as for the interviews, religious liberals exceeded conservatives in their use of the Ethic of Autonomy, whereas conservatives exceeded liberals in use of the Ethic of Divinity. There were few differences on the Ethic of Community. This was true across all three age groups (Jensen, 1997b).

To sum up, the findings from the ethnographic research, interview study, and questionnaire survey provided quite robust support for the conclusion that the two religious cultures have different hierarchies of ethics. For religious conservatives, as seen in Figure 1, Ethics of Divinity and Community are well above the Ethic of Autonomy. For religious liberals, Ethics of Autonomy and Community are above the Ethic of Divinity.

Subsequent research by social psychologists has also focused on political liberals and conservatives. Using a coding system derived from the Three Ethics, this research has found the same two hierarchies of ethics as in my research with religious groups (e.g., McAdams et al. 2008).

Furthermore, these two different hierarchies of Ethics have been found in research with religious liberal and conservative Hindus in India (Jensen, 1998a, 2008), and religiously liberal

and conservative Lutherans in Finland (Vainio, 2015). The findings may be suggestive of the

moral psychologies that underlie the post-WWII, worldwide differentiation that social observers

have noted between modernism and fundamentalism. However, it would be inaccurate to

conclude that, for example, liberal American Baptists, liberal Finnish Lutherans, and liberal

Hindu Indians are one and the same. That would gloss over important diversity between religions

and nations, even as they appear to share a similar hierarchy of Ethics.

IV. THE CULTURAL-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH
TO MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

The corpus of research on religious liberals and conservatives, from young through older

adulthood, does not line up with claims of universal moral development. Almost a century's

worth of developmental research on morality (Freud, 1930/1961; Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget,

1932/1965; Turiel, 1983) has postulated one universal pathway of moral development. The

general argument, with some variations among theories, is that young children are self-focused,

then broaden their horizons to consider others as they grow older, and then come to think in

terms of concepts of rights and equity in the course of adolescence or adulthood. However, as

just detailed, the two groups of religiously liberal and conservative adults have different

hierarchies of ethics. Over the course of their development they have not ended up in the same

place, and it stands to reason that there must be more than one developmental pathway of moral

psychology. Yet, it also seems reasonable to grant that a century's worth of developmental

research provides a valuable trove of information, even if the claims regarding a single and fixed

pathway need rethinking.

In order to bridge findings from cultural and universalistic research traditions on moral psychology (Jensen, 2011b, 2012b), I have proposed the cultural-developmental approach. This theory draws on the research with liberal and conservative religious communities detailed above. I also build on a review of a large set of valuable findings from other research traditions. The findings come from traditions as varied as structural-developmental and domain theory (e.g., Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1984; Turiel, 1983), cultural psychology and anthropology perspectives on morality (e.g., Whiting & Edwards, 1988; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990; Trommsdorff & Chen, 2012), and research on the origins and development of prosocial emotions and norms (e.g., Thompson, 2012; Vaish & Tomasello, 2014; Padilla-Walker & Carlo, 2014; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006).

As will be described in a moment, these findings have been synthesized—and sometimes reinterpreted—to propose the cultural-developmental approach. Thus it is not a case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, to use a fairly common idiom. Rather it is a call to recognize that babies are instantly immersed in different cultural environments, and as they grow into adulthood they become increasing culturally diverse. All babies may be moral (Bloom, 2013), but they are not particularly diverse in their morality. Adults from different cultures, however, are diverse.

The cultural-developmental approach introduces the concept of a *template*, as mentioned at the outset. The template charts developmental trajectories across the life course for the three Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. Research has shown the presence of these three ethics among highly varied age and cultural groups (e.g., Arnett & Jensen, 2015; Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001; Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010, 2015a; Hickman & Fasoli, 2015; Pandya & Bhangaokar, 2015; Kapadia & Bhangaokar, 2015; Padilla-Walker & Nelson, 2015; Rozin,

Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001). In the

cultural-developmental approach, the inclusion of three ethics provides for pluralism.

Furthermore, the developmental templates for each ethic are flexible, rather than fixed.

Specifically, as we will see, they accommodate the different hierarchies of Ethics held by

culturally diverse peoples. The cultural-developmental approach, thus, represents a new kind of

theoretical approach—one that allows for pluralism and flexibility, while still recognizing some

degree of commonality in development. Within this approach, ontogenetic development is not

determinative but nor is there a limitless cultural range.

Let's turn first to the developmental templates for each ethic, and then to how these

pathways flexibly accommodate to cultural variation. Figure 2 shows the template of trajectories

for each ethic from childhood into adulthood. As illustrated, the argument is that Ethic of

Autonomy reasoning emerges early in childhood and the degree to which persons use this ethic

stays relatively stable across adolescence and into adulthood. The specific types of Autonomy

reasons that persons use are likely, however, to change with age. Thus, a substantial body of

research has shown that from early on, children in different cultures focus on harm to the self and

the interests of the self (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Snarey, 1985; Walker,

1989), as well as the needs and interests of other individuals (Bloom, 2013; Carlo, 2006;

Gilligan, 1982; Miller, 1994; Turiel, 2002; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). As persons in

different cultures grow into adolescence and adulthood, some consideration of the welfare of the

self and other individuals remains (Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & Van Court, 1995; Gilligan,

1982; Vasquez et al. 2001; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995; Zimba, 1994). Adolescents

and adults, however, also begin to speak of reasons such as individual rights and equity in a

consistent manner—even if these do not prevail across cultures (Killen, 2002; Miller & Luthar, 1989; Piaget, 1932; Snarey, 1985; Walker, 1989; Zimba, 1994).

The proposal, then, is that Autonomy reasoning stays *relatively* stable across the lifespan but with some changes in types of Autonomy reasoning. This proposal is based on the extensive literature on moral development. However, I think it is worth mentioning that in cultures where there is a very strong push for collectivity and/or submission to divinity, there may be somewhat of a decline in Autonomy reasoning with age. In such cultures, considerations of the needs, desires, and interests of individuals—especially the self—would be seen as either irrelevant or even morally objectionable, and hence by adulthood such considerations might diminish. The extent and prevalence of such a potential decline remains to be addressed in future research (for further discussion, see Jensen & Mckenzie, 2016).

The Ethic of Community, according to the cultural-developmental approach, rises throughout childhood and into adolescence and adulthood both in degree of usage and the diversity of types of reasons. Findings have consistently indicated that younger children in very diverse cultures invoke Community reasons such as family interests and customs (Kohlberg, 1984; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990; Thompson, 2012). Moral reasoning related to the family is likely to find continued expression past childhood and probably even more so in the course of adolescence and adulthood as a person's awareness of and experiences with diverse types of family considerations increases, such as duty to family in addition to family interests and customs (Miller et al., 1990). By late childhood and adolescence, Community reasons that pertain to social groups other than the family are added (Carlo, 2006; Whiting & Edwards, 1988), including concern for friends (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006) and peers and authority figures in places such as school and work

(Schlegel, 2011). Cross-sectional and longitudinal findings across cultures have shown that by late adolescence or adulthood even more Community reasons are added, such as a focus on societal organization (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Eisenberg et al., 2002; Nisan, 1987; Walker, 1989; Zimba, 1994).

Turning to the Ethic of Divinity, for which less research on moral reasoning is available, the proposal is that its use will often be low among children but will rise in adolescence and become similar to adult use. Diverse religions have ceremonies in early or mid-adolescence that confer moral responsibility on adolescents and link that responsibility to knowledge of religious teachings (Mahoney, Pargament, Murray-Swank, & Murray-Swank, 2003). Adolescence appears to be a notable time for the development of religiosity or spirituality, even in societies where affiliation with religious institutions is low (Trommsdorff, 2012). Research has also indicated that adults often explain their moral behaviors in terms of divinity concepts (Colby & Damon, 1992; Shweder et al., 1990), including adults from relatively secular communities (McAdams et al., 2008; Walker et al., 1995).

The potential infusion of divinity reasoning in adolescence, however, may especially characterize religious cultures that emphasize scriptural authority or where people conceive of supernatural entities (e.g., God) as largely distinct from humans (e.g., omniscient and omnipotent). In these communities, the culturally articulated concepts pertaining to supernatural entities are of such an abstract nature that they may be readily translated into moral reasoning only by adolescents whose cognitive skills allow for more abstraction than those of younger children (Adelson, 1971; Keating, 1990; Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1972).

In cultures, however, where scriptural accounts of supernatural or transcendent entities are less salient or where people regard such entities as less distinct from humans, it is possible

that Divinity concepts are more accessible to and hence used more by children in their moral

reasoning (Saraswathi, 2005). In some Hindu Indian communities, for example, religious

devotion finds expression in tangible and recurrent activities (e.g., bathing, dressing, and feeding

the gods); there are many places within and outside the home for worship (e.g., household and

roadside shrines, temples); and there are a variety of persons seen to have god-like status or

special connections with the gods (e.g., gurus, sadhus [renouncers], temple priests) (Jensen,

1998a; Shweder et al., 1990). In such cultures, children may reason about moral issues in terms

of Ethic of Divinity concepts from fairly early on because these concepts are tied repeatedly to

specific everyday activities and objects. Then in the course of adolescence and adulthood,

additional Divinity concepts may become part of a person's moral reasoning.

The developmental trajectories in Figure 2, as noted, are intended as a *template* that

accommodates the different hierarchies of ethics held by culturally diverse peoples. The

argument is that in order to put forth reasonably specific hypotheses about the development of

each of the three ethics, we need to know not only about ontogeny but also about culture. In

other words, the slopes and endpoints of the developmental trajectories are dependent on how the

ethics are hierarchized within a culture.

For example, there is a more pronounced emphasis on the Ethic of Community in Taiwan

than in the United States, and a stronger emphasis on the Ethic of Autonomy in the U.S. than

Taiwan (Miller, Fung, Lin, Chen, & Boldt, 2012; see also Li, 2011, 2012). These different

hierarchies interact with development. Thus the Ethics of Community and Autonomy are likely

to emerge at different points in childhood in Taiwan and the U.S., to develop along somewhat

different slopes, and to reach different endpoints in adulthood.

To give another example, let's return to Figure 1 which lays out the two different hierarchies of ethics characteristic of religiously conservative and liberal adults. Based on these hierarchies, different developmental trajectories of moral reasoning within the two religious cultures would be expected (Jensen, 2008, 2011b). Within religiously liberal groups, as seen in Figure 3A, the hypothesis is that children, adolescents, and adults frequently will use the Ethic of Autonomy. Community reasons will be rarer among children but will then become quite common among adolescents and adults. Divinity will be used infrequently at all ages and if it emerges, this will only occur in the course of adolescence.

Figure 3B shows predictions for religiously conservative groups. The expectation is that these children, adolescents, and adults will use Autonomy infrequently. There may be some decrease over the lifespan because of the strong emphasis on renouncing self-interest among religious conservatives. With respect to Community, the expectation is that its prevalence will rise steadily from childhood to reach a high level in adulthood. The Ethic of Divinity will be low among children, but will then rise markedly in adolescence and remain high throughout adulthood.

V. TESTING CULTURAL-DEVELOPMENTAL HYPOTHESES:
EXAMPLES OF RECENT RESEARCH

In brief, then, the cultural-developmental approach aims to capture how development and culture co-modulate. Recent research has aimed to test and extend the theory in a variety of ways. This has also included the development of new methodologies and measurement instruments.

A. CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS, AND ADULTS IN THE U.S.

To test the cultural-developmental hypotheses represented by Figures 3A and 3B above, a recent study was conducted with sixty mainline and sixty evangelical Presbyterians in a metropolitan area on the East Coast of the United States. Within each of these two religiously liberal and conservative communities, even numbers of children (7-12 years, $M = 10.03$, $SD = 1.38$), adolescents (13-18 years, $M = 15.03$, $SD = 1.60$), and adults (36-57 years, $M = 45.88$, $SD = 4.65$) were included.

All participants took part in interviews about two kinds of moral issues. As in the research with Baptist adults described earlier, participants responded to "public" issues such as divorce and giving money to a panhandler where moral judgments are for people in general. In this study, participants also recounted an experience from their own life that they considered to have involved a moral decision. These were termed "private" issues (Jensen &McKenzie, 2016).

Both public and private issues were included in order to extend previous research on the culture wars. This research has examined the moral statements put forth by religious organizations and their leaders in public forums (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Hunter, 1991; Lakoff, 1996), or it has presented lay persons with public issues (e.g., suicide in the case of terminal illness) where they discussed the extent to which these issues are morally right or wrong for people in general (Jensen, 1998a, 2008). As we have seen, findings have indicated that mainline Protestant lay believers rarely invoke divinity reasons when rendering judgments for people in general (Jensen, 2008). However, some have even claimed that "liberals"—as evinced for example through analyses of church sermons—do not have a language of divinity at all (Graham et al., 2009).

Yet, ethnographic and interview findings suggest that religion and spirituality are of importance in religiously liberal adults' moral lives. First, as described above, the mainline

Baptist minister invoked Ethic of Divinity language in his sermons, including the importance of

"disciple-making." Second, mainline congregations and their parishioners engage in community

projects that are framed in religious terms (Jensen, 2015c). Third, when asked to describe God in

interviews, religiously liberal adults provide extensive and detailed descriptions. Many of these

descriptions are connected to morality, including the notion that a belief in God clarifies the

extent of human free will, and the nature of right and wrong (Jensen, 2009).

Interestingly, two to three decades ago, it was findings from studies that focused on

people's private moral experiences that helped draw attention to divinity reasoning in moral

psychology. In a study of American moral exemplars, for example, almost 80% based their

moral behaviors on religious faith even though they had not been selected on the basis of criteria

pertaining to religion (Colby & Damon, 1992). Another study that probed the moral experiences

and ideals of a broad sample of Canadian adults also found a surprising degree of references to

religiosity and spirituality (Walker et al., 1995). Thus for the present study, I considered it

important to include private moral issue in addition to public ones in order to obtain a fuller

understanding of lay believers' moral reasoning.

Three key findings stood out. First, religious liberals and conservatives share important

developmental features. As hypothesized (see Figures 3A and 3B), children—whether they lived

in a liberal or conservative household—reasoned more in terms of the Ethic of Autonomy and

less in terms of the Ethic of Community, as compared to adolescents and adults. Table 5 shows

these results (for an explication of all results and statistical analyses, see Jensen & McKenzie,

2016). The children especially focused on the physical and mental well-being and interests of

self and other individuals. In response to question of whether or not to give money to a

panhandler, a conservative girl, for example, thought it best not to give money to a panhandler,

"because they could go out to the store and buy like cigarettes or something that's not good for them. So it would be better to just give them some kind of food." A liberal girl sounded similarly concerned for the physical well-being of panhandlers, "If you give them food and water…and stuff they'll be able to live for a longer amount of time."

Second, there is much more to moral development than age or common maturation alone. Culture indeed shapes moral trajectories. Cultural differences were already evident by about age 10, which was the mean age of the children. Conservative children thought in terms of the Ethic of Divinity whereas liberal children did not (see Table 5). A 9-year-old boy from the conservative community supported giving money to a panhandler, "because God tells us to give things." In contrast, a 10-year-old girl from the liberal community emphasized fairness, an Ethic of Autonomy concept that was super popular among liberal children. She explained that a panhandler is just as deserving as anyone else: "just like if you took all [of] Queen Elizabeth's stuff away, she'd be just as poor as the panhandler. It's just they don't have enough stuff to get as far as Queen Elizabeth." The study showed that the cultural differences became more pronounced with age.

Third, the role of culture in moral development becomes even more evident when comparing public and private spheres of reasoning. As compared to conservative children, not only did conservative adolescents and adults reason more in terms of Divinity but they showed a bifurcation where they invoked Divinity more for public than private issues. In other words, they not only thought of their own moral lives in terms of considerations pertaining to God and scriptures, but they especially emphasized these considerations in terms of how they believed everyone ought to think and behave. This result harkens back to the emphasis in fundamentalist Baptist churches on evangelism, discussed above. To conservative adolescents and adults, the

Ethic of Divinity belongs not only in the private sphere but also decidedly in the public one. Bearing witness to God, as the fundamentalist Baptist pastor had implored his congregants, should be "my all, my life."

Among liberals, in contrast, age intersected in a different way with spheres of morality for Divinity. Figures 4A and 4B illustrate the three-way interactions of religious culture, age, and issue for the Ethic of Divinity. Whereas liberal children and adolescents scarcely reasoned in terms of Divinity, liberal adults did. In contrasts to the claim that they simply lack this language, liberal adults primarily spoke of Divinity when contemplating their private moral issues. For example, a liberal adult recounted her decision to find her adoptive mother against the advice of friends, "I thought it was something that in the eyes of God it was right for me to do." Another liberal woman described how she had returned $10 to Borders bookstore that the cashier mistakenly had refunded her. She said: "God knows and so it hurts Him when you cheat. He didn't cheat on me, and I shouldn't cheat on other people. By doing the right thing, the world becomes a better place. It's not enough just to do it in bigger things, you've gotta do it in little things." Some liberal adults clearly think about moral matters in terms of religion and spirituality. Liberal adults, however, have privatized the Ethic of Divinity. These findings help cast new and nuanced light on America's "culture wars." They indicate that religious conservatives and liberals diverge on what should be society's moral lingua franca.

In other recent research with a religiously conservative community in the United States, Fasoli conducted detailed linguistic analyses of conversations between young children and parents (Hickman & Fasoli, 2015). The aim was to compare the moral reasoning of the two age groups, and also to delve into the ways that parents and children respond to one another. Results supported the prediction that religiously conservative adults reason more in term of the Ethic of

Divinity than children. The results also revealed that the parents regularly sought to reroute their children's reasoning from a focus on Autonomy to Divinity considerations. The study, then, speaks to the co-modulation of moral development and culture, as well as a process whereby that co-modulation takes place. Fasoli suggests that parental socialization by means of everyday moral discourse contributes to the rise in the Ethic of Divinity from childhood into adolescence among religious conservatives that is predicted in Figure 3B.

B. DIVINITY REASONING AMONG CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN INDIA

As described earlier, the infusion of divinity reasoning in adolescence may especially characterize religious cultures where concepts pertaining to supernatural entities are of such an abstract nature that they may be readily translated into moral reasoning only by adolescents whose cognitive skills allow for more abstraction than those of younger children. In other religious cultures where people regard divine entities as less distinct from humans, it is possible that Divinity concepts are used by children in their moral reasoning (Saraswathi, 2005).

As noted above, religious devotion often finds expression in tangible and recurrent activities in Hindu Indian communities. Examining one Hindu Indian community in the state of Gujarat, Pandya and Bhangaokar (2015) recently found that Divinity reasoning was common among 3rd and 6th grade children, and just as common as Autonomy reasoning. The early developmental prominence of the Ethic of Divinity among Indian children supports the cultural-developmental proposal. Currently, a longitudinal study is under way with the Indian children who are now in early- and mid-adolescence in order to examine if the Ethic of Divinity rises further.

C. AUTONOMY REASONING IN EMERGING ADULTHOOD

The cultural-developmental approach predicts a relatively stable use of the ethic of

Autonomy from childhood into adulthood. Cultures which afford young people in their twenties

a prolonged period of identity exploration, also termed emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2004), may

nonetheless see a momentary upswing in the Ethic of Autonomy (Jensen, 2015a). The hallmarks

of emerging adulthood—independent decision-making, financial self-sufficiency, and accepting

responsibility for oneself—all center on Ethic of Autonomy considerations. Some past research

with American emerging adults of diverse socio-economic backgrounds supports the prediction

of an uptick (Arnett et al., 2001).

Recently, researchers have further tested this proposal. Padilla-Walker and Nelson (2015)

examined the moral reasoning of American emerging adults from a religiously conservative

community of Latter Day Saints (LDS, or Mormons). As they noted, this sample constitutes an

interesting test because of the potential pull toward Autonomy for American emerging adults,

and the simultaneous pull toward Divinity in LDS culture. The study found evidence for

considerable attention to the Ethic of Autonomy, even as the Ethic of Divinity was generally

rated as significantly more important. The study also extensively explored how these two ethics

were related in the thoughts and behaviors of the sample.

It is worth noting that the study made use of a new measurement instrument, the *Ethical

Values Assessment (EVA)*. This questionnaire measures the extent of endorsement of value

statements that reflect the three ethics (Jensen & Padilla-Walker, 2015; Padilla-Walker & Jensen,

2016). Table 6 lists sample items. There is an 18-item EVA long form (EVA_L) and a 12-item

short form (EVA_S), allowing researchers a choice based on their study aims and logistics. Items

for EVA_L were developed on the basis of the subcategories within the standard coding manual

for the three ethics (Table 1). In order to further enhance the cross-cultural applicability of the

questionnaire, it also includes an open-ended question that allows participants to indicate additional ethical values of importance to them. On the EVA, participants are typically asked to respond to the following probe: "What moral values do you think are important to how you should live your life at this time in your life?" (Arnett et al., 2001). Depending on the aims of researchers, however, the probe for EVA may be substituted or supplemented. For example, an option would be to ask: "What moral values do you want to pass on to the next generation?" (Arnett et al., 2001). EVA has been translated into a number of languages, including Arabic, Spanish, Thai, and Turkish, and research is under way in a number of countries. A validation study of EVA has found that it may be used not only with emerging adults, but also persons of other ages (Padilla-Walker & Jensen, 2016).

Apart from the research on American emerging adults' use of the Ethic of Autonomy, recent research has also focused on other countries. Guerra and Giner-Sorolla (2015) found that emerging adults reasoned more in terms of Autonomy than the other two kinds of ethics in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The interesting, if not entirely surprising, exception was Japan where Autonomy was tied with Community.

Apart from the above examples of recent research, a number of ongoing and recent studies examining other cultural-developmental hypotheses in regards to morality can be found in *Moral development in a global world: Research from a cultural-developmental perspective* (Jensen, 2015b).

VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

There are three key implications of the above findings for future research on moral psychology that I would highlight.

A. RESEARCH ACROSS THE LIFE COURSE

One implication is that moral development must be examined across the life course. The findings point to the co-modulation of development and culture, with culture becoming increasingly prominent over the course of development. Certainly, ontogenetic development channels culture. Children live within more circumscribed community boundaries than adolescents and adults, undoubtedly for reasons having to do with their physical and mental capacities—and indeed the Ethic of Community outlook of children is narrower than it likely will be later on. To grow and thrive, children require considerable physical and emotional resources and care—and indeed the children in the studies above gave attention to Ethic of Autonomy considerations pertaining to the needs and interests of self and other individuals. Autonomy considerations do not go away among adolescents and adults, but other considerations also came to the fore.

While development channels culture, culture also shapes development. For example, as observed above, the conservative and liberal religious groups from the U.S. were different in many ways, and some of these differences were evident in children. Recall the 9-year-old religiously conservative boy quoted above who reasoned that God wants us to help panhandlers. Like other children, conservative and liberal, he spoke in detail about physical and concrete considerations. Here is an exchange between the interviewer (Q) and the boy (A): "Q: What do you think are good ways that you can help poor people? A: Give them food. Q: Any other good ways? A: A house to live in." In answering the next question, he suddenly sounded distinctly like a child growing up in an religiously conservative community. "Q: Right, anything else that people who are well off…can do to help people who are poor? A: [Give] a Bible." Not a single child from the liberal religious community suggested giving a Bible to a panhandler. Our ethnographic records show that researchers observed a Bible in nearly every religiously

conservative household. In contrast, religious items were rarely on display in religiously liberal households (Jensen & McKenzie, 2016; McKenzie & Jensen, in press). Socialization starts early, takes many forms, and has a clear and cumulative impact on the development of moral reasoning.

Recent theory on moral development and psychology has been characterized by a search for cognitions and emotions that constitute foundations of moral behavior. This search has often focused on biological foundations through evolutionary and neuroscience research, and on early developmental foundations through research with infants and young children (for reviews see Bloom, 2013; Thompson, 2012). Findings based on the cultural-developmental approach, however, suggest that the cultural modulation of moral reasoning becomes more pronounced with age. This means that conclusions about moral development on the basis of research with children are insufficient. Life course research among different cultures is necessary to know the extent to which early moral reasons remain, change, or disappear, and to know the extent to which new reasons emerge later in life.

Adults, in particular, remain remarkably underrepresented in research on moral development (Jensen, 2015f). Life expectancy at birth for both sexes globally was 70 years as of 2012, ranging from 62 years in low-income countries to 79 years in high-income countries (World Health Organization, 2015). In my view, we need to turn our attention to the many decades of people's moral lives that come after age 20 or so. Apart from the fact that this is the only way to know if moral reasoning that came earlier in life does or does not remain unchanged later in life, adulthood—perhaps more than ever—is full of changes in such areas as love and work that are highly likely to be tied to moral development. Adulthood is also when individuals are most likely to step into diverse leadership positions that come with new moral demands and

opportunities. Some 2,500 years ago, the Greek philosopher Solon wrote that from 35 to 42 years

of age is a period of maturity of mind and morals when a person's "mind, ever open to virtue,

broadens, and never inspires him to profitless deeds" (in Levinson, 1976, p. 326). Certainly,

indigenous conceptions of the life course from many different cultures, both before and after

Solon's time, have addressed developmental changes into old age, including in regards to

morality. It seems time that the contemporary scientific field of moral development does so, too.

The cultural-developmental approach provides a starting point for research, and potentially

additional theory development too, in regards to the full life course among diverse cultures.

B. RESEARCH ON INTRA- AND INTER-PERSONAL REASONING

A second notable implication of the above findings is to return to serious consideration of

the role of reasoning in morality. Moral psychology has witnessed a virtual "fall of reason" to the

"current trend in psychology and neuroscience…in favor of gut feelings" (Bloom, 2013, p.207).

But as Tomasello and colleagues have eloquently stated, the ability of humans among primates

to use cognition is unique, "[it] sticks out like an elephant's trunk, a giraffe's neck, a peacock's

tail" (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005, p.689). They further argue that "dialogic

cognitive representations" are what pave the way for human infants and toddlers to become full-

fledged contributors to collective cultural beliefs, practices, and institutions over time.

The above study, introducing a differentiation between private and public spheres of

morality, showed the significance of this distinction to the moral reasoning of all groups. In my

view, the results suggest that the development of moral reasoning in humans involves intra- and

interpersonal dialogical processes. Morality in part is a process where we have internal dialogues

with some distinct private moral reasons for weighing our behaviors. Morality is also a social

process where we dialogue, debate, and argue with others. We do this person-to-person. We also do this at the level of groups.

A fuller understanding that moral development involves intra- and interpersonal reasoning will require more research. But it has the potential to revive moral reasoning as paramount to the human condition and fundamental to human development in cultural context. This is because it makes for a much richer account of moral reasoning as both a process that takes place inside the mind, and a kind of behavior that takes place in myriad interpersonal interactions—where there may be a meeting of the minds, or not.

Furthermore, the differentiation between public and private moral reasoning may offer a venue to improve research on individual moral behavior. The field of moral development has reams of publications where individuals reason about "public" issues, such as vignettes or hypothetical dilemmas where moral judgments are applied to people in general. Predictions about individual behaviors from such public moral reasoning have been hard to establish. Perhaps ironically, the recent moral psychology focus on moral intuitions in order better to understand individual moral behavior has pushed the field even more toward the use of highly hypothetical issues, such as eating one's pet dog or pushing a heavy man onto trolley tracks. But such scenarios, removed as they are from most people's everyday lives and experiences, seem unlikely venues for in-depth knowledge or predictions about individual moral behavior. The findings here suggest that if we want to know about individual moral behavior, we will do better to focus on private moral reasoning since it turns out to differ from public moral reasoning.

Additionally, from a cultural-developmental point of view, it is also the case that private moral experiences are illuminating because they provide emic rather than etic information about

morality. In other words, they illuminate how ordinary individuals rather than theorists define and delineate morality, and how people's definitions may well vary across age and culture.

C. RESEARCH WITH MULTIPLE AND NEW METHODS

The third, and related, implication is to broaden our research methods. It is a fundamental research method truism that what researchers learn from their participants depends on what they ask of or do with those participants in the first place. For many decades, much of the research on morality has focused on public issues of various kinds, be they games (Piaget, 1932), hypothetical dilemmas and vignettes (Kohlberg, 1984; Turiel, 1983), or general moral issues (Jensen, 1998a). This line of research has been useful. That said, research asking people about their private moral experiences reveals something new. Likewise, ethnographic research and systematic observations of everyday moral conversations are also proving revealing.

It is a potent insight of cultural psychology that we cannot assume that methods retain the same meaning across different cultures. There seems to be a vast potential for developing new methods or analytic approaches based on knowledge of local cultures. For example, in one recent study based on the cultural-developmental approach, Kapadia and Bhangaokar (2015) examined the extent to which adolescents and adults in India resolved moral dilemmas through a process of autonomous decision-making or interpersonal negotiation. The adults were more community oriented than the adolescents in two ways. First, they reasoned more in terms of the Ethic of Community. Second, the adult relied more on conversations and consultations with other people in order to reach moral judgments. These findings fit with the cultural-developmental template (see Figure 2) and the specific hypothesis proposed by the researchers that the Ethic of Community would peak in adulthood in a culture where a collectivistic orientation is highly valued.

VII. CONCLUSION: MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND BEYOND

This article has presented a theory, research findings, and measurement instruments that address moral psychology as a plural phenomenon that is co-modulated by culture and development. In my view, the universal aspirations of many theories of the last century are giving way to something more flexible that recognizes both local and global psychological phenomena.

At the outset of a new century, it is also noteworthy just how fast cultures are changing (Jensen, 2015g). Culturally insular communities are rapidly changing in the wave of globalization (e.g., Hermans, 2015; Jensen, 2003, 2010, 2015a; Jensen & Arnett, 2012; Jensen, Arnett, & McKenzie, 2011; Jensen & Chen, 2013; Jensen & Larson 2015; Silbereisen & Chen, 2010; Trommsdorff, 2000). Isolated cultures are a phenomenon of yore. Culture, too, is becoming something more flexible that psychological theory needs to take into account.

The cultural-developmental approach to moral psychology is a new way to conceptualize multiplicity across the life course among diverse and changing cultures. As noted at the outset, psychologists have documented multiplicity for many other areas of psychology, including intelligence, creativity, and self. For these areas, cultural-developmental templates could also be formulated to guide new and in-depth hypotheses and research.

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Table 1: Subcategories within the Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity

Autonomy	Punishment Avoidance (to self)
	Reward Seeking (to self)
	Self's Physical Well-Being
	Self's Psychological Well-Being
	Self's Interest
	Other Individual's Physical Well-being
	Other Individual's Psychological Well-being
	Other Individual's Interest
	Fairness and Reciprocity
	Conscience (guilt)
	Virtues (autonomy-oriented)
	Responsibility (for self)
	Means-Ends Consideration: Ends of an Individual
	Rights
	Other Autonomy
Community	Punishment Avoidance: Social Sanctions
	Reward Seeking: Social Benefits
	Others' Physical Well-Being
	Others' Psychological Well-Being
	Others' Interest
	Important Socially-Defined Person's Authority
	Customary or Traditional Authority
	Legal Authority (of social institution)
	Virtues (community-oriented)
	Duty (to others)
	Means-Ends Considerations: Ends of Social Group
	Social Order or Harmony Goals
	Other Community
Divinity	Punishment Avoidance (from God(s))
	Reward Seeking (from God(s))
	Self's Physical Well-Being (Body as God's temple)
	Interest of Self's Soul
	Other's Physical Well-Being (Body as God's temple)
	Interest of Other's Soul
	Important Spiritually-Defined Person's Authority
	Customary or Traditional Authority (of spiritual/religious nature)
	Legal Authority (of religious institution)
	Authority of Natural Law
	Scriptural Authority
	God(s)' Authority
	Conscience (when God-given)
	Virtues (divinity-oriented)
	Duty (as spiritual/religious being)
	Other Divinity

Table 2: Use of Ethic of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity by Religious Conservatives and Liberals (Mean number)

	Moral Issue	Religious Cultures		p
		Conservative	Liberal	
Autonomy	Suicide: Generally	0.15	0.84	***
	Suicide: Terminal Illness	0.05	1.30	***
	Divorce	0.55	1.35	*
	Abortion	0.30	1.35	***
Community	Suicide: Generally	0.90	0.95	ns
	Suicide: Terminal Illness	0.40	0.60	ns
	Divorce	1.75	0.80	ns
	Abortion	0.75	0.40	ns
Divinity	Suicide: Generally	1.50	0.26	***
	Suicide: Terminal Illness	1.10	0.15	***
	Divorce	1.60	0.30	***
	Abortion	1.70	0.25	***

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 3: Sample Item from Three Ethics Reasoning Assessment (TERA)

This is a survey of your moral views. Please read the questions and instructions carefully. The instructions below are given in capital letters and are underlined.
1) Do you think that generally it is morally wrong or not wrong for terminally ill persons to end their life through suicide? If you have difficulty in deciding, please circle <u>the position you most agree with</u>.
     a) Yes, it is morally wrong **(GO TO QUESTION 2)**
     b) No, it is not morally wrong **(GO TO QUESTION 3)**
     ----
2) Following is a list of statements that people sometimes make in order to explain why suicide in the case of terminal illness is morally wrong. Please read all of these statements carefully, then circle the statements that you think are true and <u>the most important</u>. You must circle at least <u>one</u> statement, but you may not circle more than <u>four</u> statements.

     a) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is morally wrong because even a person who is ill may still experience some happiness.
     b) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is morally wrong because there are many situations where people who have been in hard times have caused others to reflect about their lives. Someone with a terminal illness might help other people change their lives for the better.
     c) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is morally wrong because the Bible says that, "Thou shalt not kill" which includes not killing oneself.
     d) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is morally wrong because contrary to expectations you might suddenly get better, and if you commit suicide, you will miss out on the rest of your life.
     e) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is morally wrong because it cheapens life, and once society goes down that path there is no knowing where it will end in terms of whose lives will be dispensable.
     f) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is morally wrong because even when we are ill God still has a purpose for us.
     g) Other: _____

3) Following is a list of statements that people sometimes make in order to explain why suicide in the case of terminal illness is not morally wrong. Please read all of these statements carefully, then circle the statements that you think are true and <u>the most important</u>. You must circle at least <u>one</u> statement, but you may not circle more than <u>four</u> statements.

     a) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is not morally wrong because it puts an end to the physical pain and suffering that the person is likely to experience.
     b) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is not morally wrong because it is emotionally damaging to the family to watch a loved one suffer and grow weaker and more incapacitated.
     c) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is not morally wrong because it is not wrong in the eyes of God.
     d) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is not morally wrong because God will not make a judgment on you and punish you for that.
     e) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is not morally wrong because it is a financial burden on society to keep someone alive who will soon die.
     f) Suicide in the case of terminal illness is not morally wrong because a person has the right to make that decision.
     g) Other: _____

Table 4: Use of Ethic of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity by Young, Midlife, and Older Adult Religious Conservatives and Liberals (Mean number)

	Moral Issue	Young Adults		P	Midlife Adults		P	Older Adults		P
		Conservative	Liberal		Conservative	Liberal		Conservative	Liberal	
Autonomy	Suicide: Generally	0.00	0.53	**	0.00	0.49	**	0.05	0.37	*
	Suicide: Terminal Illness	0.40	1.05	**	0.05	1.15	***	0.21	1.15	***
	Divorce	0.15	0.60	*	0.05	0.84	***	0.32	0.90	**
	Abortion	0.84	0.84	ns	0.74	0.79	**	0.74	0.90	ns
Community	Suicide: Generally	0.75	1.16	ns	0.32	1.30	***	0.89	1.26	ns
	Suicide: Terminal Illness	0.65	0.60	ns	0.53	0.40	ns	0.95	0.50	ns
	Divorce	0.70	1.00	ns	0.37	0.95	ns	1.00	1.05	ns
	Abortion	0.32	0.74	ns	0.32	0.42	***	0.53	0.65	ns
Divinity	Suicide: Generally	1.75	0.79	***	1.74	0.50	***	1.89	1.00	***
	Suicide: Terminal Illness	1.65	0.85	**	1.79	0.35	***	1.53	0.65	*
	Divorce	1.10	0.55	**	1.16	0.58	***	1.21	0.55	***
	Abortion	1.74	0.84	**	1.95	0.37	***	1.58	0.65	***

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 5: Use of Ethic of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity by Religious Conservative and Liberal children, adolescents, and adults: Means and (Standard Deviations)

Ethics	Children					Adolescents					Adults			
	Conservative		Liberal			Conservative		Liberal			Conservative		Liberal	
	Priv	Publ	Priv	Pub		Priv	Publ	Priv	Publ		Priv	Publ	Priv	Publ
Autonomy	1.20	1.20	1.35	1.49		1.00	1.02	1.59	1.49		1.00	0.68	.90	1.21
	(1.06)	(0.56)	(0.99)	(0.47)		(1.00)	(0.35)	(1.18)	(0.33)		(1.03)	(0.41)	(0.79)	(0.45)
Community	0.15	0.61	0.65	0.57		1.00	1.08	1.18	0.99		0.89	1.50	1.45	0.88
	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.88)	(0.53)		(0.94)	(0.58)	(1.07)	(0.44)		(1.02)	(0.57)	(1.00)	(0.39)
Divinity	0.50	0.32	0	0.07		0.47	0.96	0.06	0.11		0.78	1.19	0.38	0.20
	(0.69)	(0.33)	(0)	(0.16)		(0.70)	(0.48)	(0.24)	(0.17)		(0.94)	(0.61)	(0.49)	(0.26)

Note. a) Priv = Private issue, Publ = Public issue.

Table 6: Sample Item from Ethical Values Assessment (EVA)

What moral values do you think are important to how you should live **at this time in your life?**

	Not at all Important	Slightly Important	Moderately Important	Very Important	Completely Important
1. I should take responsibility for myself	1	2	3	4	5
2. I should take care of my family	1	2	3	4	5
3. I should aim for spiritual salvation	1	2	3	4	5
4. I should take good care of my body.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I should be a good member of society	1	2	3	4	5
6. I should take care of my soul	1	2	3	4	5
7. I should feel good about myself	1	2	3	4	5
8. I should be cooperative	1	2	3	4	5

Indicate the <u>three</u> moral values from the above list that you consider the <u>most</u> important to how you should live at this time in your life. Indicate the number that is written in front of the statement.
Most important: #_____
Most important: #_____
Most important: #_____

In your own words, indicate if there are moral values that you consider <u>completely important</u> to how you should live at this time in your life which are <u>not</u> mentioned on the list above.
1)_____
2)_____
3)_____

Figure 1: Use of Three Ethics Among Religiously Conservative and Liberal Adults

Figure 2: The Cultural-Developmental Template of Moral Reasoning

Note. Each of the lines shows developmental patterns across the life span, from childhood to adulthood. The positions of the lines do *not* indicate their relative frequency in relation to one another (e.g., use of Autonomy being more frequent than use of Community and Divinity).

Figure 3A: Hypothesized Expression of Template among Religious Liberals

Figure 3B: Hypothesized Expression of Template among Religious Conservatives

Figure 4A: Ethic of Divinity Among Liberal Protestants: Age X Moral Issue Interaction


Figure 4B: Ethic of Divinity Among Conservative Protestants: Age X Moral Issue Interaction